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Two Factions
Within the Bourgeois-Imperialist Counter-Revolution

Part I
Extracted from Besooy-e-Sosyalism No. 1 July 1980

The February Uprising did not resolve the struggle over political power, but developed it from a historical-class point at view. For although it temporarily withdrew the question of seizure of political power from the agenda of immediate struggles of the revolutionary masses — who were under the illusion that victory was at hand - it at the same time provided the grounds for the representation of this question in more direct terms, released from the narrow framework of an above-class anti-monarchist struggle which, in the context of the absence of an independent proletarian policy, had been imposed on the revolutionary movement by the liberal bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois leadership. The February Uprising was, therefore, a determining moment in exposing the class content of the Iranian revolution. The Uprising emphasised the reality that the final resolution of the current revolution, as a democratic revolution in a capitalist country dominated by imperialism, above all requires the settling account between the two main classes of society, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; and that both the revolution and the counter-revolution still have to develop in so far as their class composition, their ideological and political leadership and also their slogans and methods are Concerned.

The Uprising entrusted the decisive conclusion of the present revolution to the process of more concrete formation of the forces of the revolution and the Counter-revolution. Thus the history of our revolution after the February Uprising is indeed but the history of the development and formation of the two camps of the revolution and the counter-revolution.

In spite of all its eclecticism and Confusion, the communist movement has elucidated the general outlines of the necessary process of development of the camp of the revolution for victory: the independent rank of the revolutionary proletariat must be established; the class party of the proletariat, the communist party, must be founded on the basis of Leninist stands, taking over the leadership of this independent rank and thereby the leadership of the revolutionary democratic movement, organising and leading the struggle for the smash of the state machine of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. The examination of the ideological, political and organisational causes of the failure in fulfilling the needs of the revolutionary proletariat in the long-term opportunity there existed especially after the February

Uprising itself requires a separate analysis by the communists. However, one can hope that the struggle which is today arising in the communist movement between revolutionary Marxism and opportunism and revisionism, may open the way for this cause.

But, what we are here concerned with is to study the manner of formation of the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution. We also intend to examine the causes of the emergence of that specific bourgeois political force capable of organising the ranks of the counter-revolution in its final onslaught against the camp of the revolution, and leading the, final attempt of the bourgeoisie and imperialism to consolidate its political power. The discussion of the factions within the ruling body must not be looked upon outside this context. The government which took shape from the midst of, or rather in spite of, the February Uprising, was undoubtedly the initial form of the political leadership of the counterrevolution. Therefore, as we asserted from the day after the Uprising it must be viewed and understood as a bourgeois government committed to defending capital and imperialism. For this reason, we at the outset have clarified our position with regard to the general framework of the conflicts between the two factions which have appeared today as the

Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the Bani-Sadrist tendency: the discussion is about the analysis of the two factions within the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution and in this analysis, contrary to many nationalists and humanists in Marxism's clothing, we neither seek to find a progressive, national, popular, and so forth, faction in the government, nor an "ally" and an issue in the latter deserving "conditional support" on the part of the proletariat; but rather we are in search of the place acquired by each of the two factions in the counterrevolutionary struggle of imperialism. The basic and general outlines of the counterrevo1utiony struggle are quite clear:

    1) The Iranian revolution must be suppressed; the revolutionary workers and toilers and their political organisations must be crushed; the Ariyamehrian[1] repression must prevail throughout the country and, in one word, the bourgeois counter-revolutionary order must be restored in the society; and

    2) A new cycle of capital accumulation must start; the defeated workers and toilers, under an unprecedented poverty and destitution, must render their labour power for the lowest price to capital in absolute silence and capitulation, so that the economic crisis of capital tends to abate and, in one word, a productive order corresponding to a capitalist country dominated by imperialism returns to the country — an order of which the mercenary Shah was the genuine representative and the guarantor of its provision for all strata of capital.

The conflicts there existed within the government since the morrow of the Uprising, are first and foremost expressive of the lack of consensus within the ranks of the counter-revolution with respect to ins and outs of a process in which the above conditions for the consolidation of the sway of capital can be realized. And it is precisely over this question that the two present factions of the counter-revolution are driven into an open conflict; they persistently struggle to call upon the bourgeoisie to adopt their proposed methods, policies and tactics, and endeavour to secure consensus in the ranks of the bourgeoisie upon definite policies and tactics. The bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution will regain, from the midst of these struggles, the form and mould of its final move. Further, the political force and the political-ideological framework which could best represent and lead the bourgeoisie in its counter-revolutionary movement will take shape.

From what we have said, it is first and foremost clear that we believe that neither of the two present factions in the government, i.e. the IRP and the Bani-Sadr's bourgeois-liberal current, on its own possesses the necessary and adequate features to acquire the position of the single political representation and leadership of the bourgeoisie in the revolution. In particular, in case of the defeat of revolution, neither of them on its own may constitute the long-term governmental alternative of this class. In other words, in our opinion, the ultimate formation of the political leader-ship of the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution is neither through the unilateral supremacy of one faction over the other, nor through the elimination of one and the survival and rise of the other, but rather through the ascension of the two factions to a higher level and the arising of that third force which will synthesize and unite the counter-revolutionary characteristics and the bourgeois essence of the policies and tactics of both factions in a single political-organisational institution clear from the limitations and shortcomings of each, coinciding to a greater extent with the interests of capital in a country like Iran.

Thus the examination and analysis of the position of the two factions in the present ruling body and their conflicts can be made by an attempt to answer the following three fundamental questions:

    1) Why does the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution not possess the necessary ideological, political and organisational coherence? What objective and subjective conditions in society have hindered the bourgeoisie to regain its single political representative and leadership?

    2) What political and ideological features and aspects must this single political leadership of the bourgeoisie — which in our belief should take shape from the midst of the conflicts of these two factions, and on the basis of the negation of both — possess? Or, in more precise terms, which aspects and features of the present two factions must be preserved and developed in a third political force which would unify the bourgeoisie, and which aspects and characteristics must be negated and discarded? And,

    3) Which place and significance each of these two factions possess in organising and leading the camp of the counter-revolution, as long as the objective and subjective grounds for this political synthesis are not provided?

In this part, we are mainly concerned with the examination of the first question. Regarding the two other questions, we are here content with few general and brief remarks, and leave the detailed discussion of them to the next part.

Where should we search for the basis of the political-ideological inconsistencies existing in the camp of the counter revolution? In our previous writings, we have noted the Shah's dictatorial regime as the representative and guardian of the total capital and all strata of the bourgeoisie in Iran. This is a reality which today, a year and a few months after an insurrection which overthrew the monarchy, is being proven not only to the communist movement whose conscience was hurt by even thinking of tae unity of the interests of the "national bourgeoisie" and the Shah's regime, but also to the bourgeoisie itself. The Shah's dictator-ship, of course, did not enjoy an active class basis even within the bourgeoisie itself. This is an undeniable fact. The Shah's rule, however, had been turned into the genuine protector and defender of the interests of all strata of capital in the country, not due to the political-ideological vote of confidence of the Iranian bourgeoisie for it, but by virtue of the economic and practical vote of confidence of all strata of capital in the domestic market to the operation of monopoly capital, whose interests had been represented directly and immediately by the Shah's regime since the expropriation of the 40's [1960's]. It is true that the Shah's government was not an achievement of the economic, political and ideological struggles of the native bourgeoisie against feudalism. Nor was it a government whose legislative and executive institutions as well as the ideological grounds of its legitimacy and rightfulness had been established, at the expense of a persistent struggle against the old system, by the Iranian bourgeoisie, and to the defence of which the bourgeoisie had consciously committed itself.

Nor a government whose necessity and desirability had been grasped by the Iranian bourgeoisie in the course of struggle against feudalism, and for the establishment and preservation of which the bourgeoisie had fought. Yes, it is true that the Shah's government was an "imposed" gift of the imperialist monopolies to the Iranian bourgeoisie. But all these realities do not diminish an iota the determining role and place of the Shah's regime in the political representation and leadership of the Iranian bourgeoisie, and in the maintenance of its inner political coherence. The reality is that the Iranian bourgeoisie not only, due to certain historical reasons, never resorted to such a consistent class struggle against feudalism, but owes its emergence as the main exploiting class in society — that is to say the destruction of feudalism and the establishment of bourgeois society in Iran — to this very monopoly capital and its rule. More importantly, the Iranian bourgeoisie, freshly released from the fetters of feudalism, after the establishment of capitalist system in the country, stepped into a period in which the course of speed of capital accumulation, despite short pauses, was unprecedented throughout the world; and this was due to nothing but the economic sway of monopoly capital and the determining role of the regime of the mercenary Shah in preserving and defending the foundations of imperialist exploitation of Iran's young working class. That the Shah's regime did not enjoy a broad class base and an active support within the Iranian bourgeoisie, was not because it was not virtually the political representation and a government serving the whole of the bourgeois class. Rather, it was because of the fact that the Iranian bourgeoisie itself, for various historical-class reasons, was not essentially in a situation to clearly understand the significance and role of that government in its survival, especially in the epoch of proletarian revolutions. The Iranian bourgeoisie, since its inception as the main exploiting class in society, was faced with the indisputable economic away of monopoly capital, for the expropriation of the 40's (the Land Reform) was itself an imperialistic process. But, on the other hand, the operation of monopoly capital was the necessary condition and the guarantor of the favourable conditions of profit making for all strata of capital in the country. In the economic sphere, therefore, there could be no other "vanguard" for the Iranian bourgeoisie but the imperialist monopolies. From the political point of view, however, the non-monopoly bourgeoisie of Iran and its liberal representatives did not have a clear class understanding. They had at the outset said "yes" to the imperialist reforms and "no" to its dictatorship[2]. They did not understand the essential relationship between the continuances of these "reforms" that is the maintenance and expansion of the conditions of profit making for capital and the political overt dictatorship (that is the undemocratic centralism within the bourgeoisie). The understanding of the relationship between economy and politics for the non-monopoly bourgeoisie of Iran required more economic and political experience such as the revolutionary crisis it has undergone during the last two years; experiences which make it broad-minded enabling it to grasp and under-stand the logic of its compassionate but indeed relentless guardian, that is monopoly capital and its mercenary government.

In this way, the Iranian bourgeoisie's content with the Shah's government may not be sought in the emergence of genuine monarchist parties (for the bourgeoisie did not basically find any need for party struggle, thanks to the existence of such government), but in the rate of capital accumulation in the domestic market and the political silence of the Iranian bourgeoisie (who had given up even the idea of saying "No" to the imperialist dictatorship) after the Land Reforms. The Shah's regime was both the symbol and the agent of preserving the inner coherence of the Iranian bourgeoisie. For it was the guarantor of the existence of such conditions of profit making for all strata of capital in the domestic market that the bourgeoisie had essentially entrusted the political thinking and practice to it, and itself was drawn into "accumulation and accumulation". And if the liberal representatives of non-monopoly capital used to groan every now and then, this was simply the reflection of the passive position of non-monopoly capital in an economy under the sway of the monopolies, and [also] the reflection of the dangers faced by non-monopoly capital, by virtue of this passive position, with any change in the parameters of production and competition. However, this "imposed" and not completely understood (on the part of the liberal bourgeoisie) coherence could only survive in so far as there was no serious barrier to the accumulation of capital; once the economic crisis intensified and led to a political crisis driving the deprived classes of society to question the government, the ideological separation between the bourgeoisie and its government acquired a determining role. The weakening of the inner unity of the bourgeoisie in periods of economic crisis and intensification of competition is a natural phenomenon. But this "natural phenomena", due to the particular burden of the crisis upon non-monopoly capital (relative to monopoly capital) on the one hand, and the Iranian non-monopoly bourgeoisie's lack of awareness of the determining place of the Shah's regime in its economic existence on the other hand, assumed an immense, and from the bourgeoisie's point of view, totally destructive dimensions. The non-monopoly bourgeoisie and its liberal representatives did not completely understand and fulfil their role in the defence of a regime which was at least for fifteen years long the defender of the brisk business of plunder. Without due attention to what they were about to lose, and in dread of the escalation of the mass movement, they wavered and turned their backs on their government. Monopoly capital did not succeed in making the non-monopoly bourgeoisie and its liberal representatives understand the necessity of active defence of the Shah's government. Thus, these nest con-fused representatives of capital, or better say the representatives of the illusion of capital in a country dominated by imperialism themselves turned into an important factor in the weakening of the bourgeoisie's political-ideological coherence. Yes, we too believe that the liberal bourgeoisie has displayed "wavering", but not as a part of the camp of the "revolution" and towards the "struggle", but as a part of the "counter-revolution" and with regard to the "suppression of the revolutionary movement". In this way, if in the beginning of the revolution, the economic crisis and the intensification of competition within the Iranian bourgeoisie brought forth the objective grounds for the weakening of the bourgeoisie's inner coherence, the escalation of the mass movement, the fear of the Iranian bourgeoisie and the failure of the liberal bourgeoisie to under-stand concretely the political-ideological needs of the sway of capital in Iran, provided its subjective grounds, aggravating the political tension within the bourgeoisie.

The political representatives of monopoly capital and the liberal bourgeoisie of Iran, constituted the two factions of the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution until the compromise of the winter of 1357 [1919-Ed.]; a compromise which was not only the point of betrayal by the petty-bourgeois leadership of the revolutionary movement, but also the point of retreat for monopoly capital. When the escalation of the revolutionary movement made the Shah's overthrow inevitable, monopoly capital was forced to retreat to the position of the liberal bourgeoisie which was trying to bridle the revolutionary movement at the level [it had already reached]. The conciliatory petty-bourgeois leadership whose revolutionism was to become void of any kind of content with the downfall of the monarchical regime, and who had found out the inevitability of the emergence of new revolutionary leaders with the advance of the masses' struggles beyond the bounds of the anti-monarchist struggle, and monopoly capital which had assented to the Shah's downfall in a power struggle with the rank of the revolution, both reached a compromise at one point, namely the Shah's downfall and the, preservation of the sway of capital with minimum destruction of the governmental machine, that is precisely the position of the liberal bourgeoisie. The transformation of the governmental apparatus to the liberal bourgeoisie enjoying the moral support of the petty-bourgeois leadership and the material support (though undoubtedly temporary) of monopoly capital, was planned. The contract for "the end of revolution" was signed by the two parties of the deal. The army was announced as the brother of the masses, and Bazargan as the popular premier; arms were declared as forbidden for the masses and as lawful for the state barracks; and an all-sided endeavour to prevent an armed insurrection, which had already turned into the slogan of the masses, was launched.

However, it must be pointed out here that if the petty-bourgeois leadership and the liberal bourgeoisie had in their mind achieved in this deal all that they perceived as victory, monopoly capital had merely resorted to a tactical retreat.

In the epoch of imperialism and in a dominated country, the liberal bourgeoisie cannot he the stable representative of the interests of the total social capital, a capital which has so fused with the operation of the imperialist monopolies. Monopoly capital had clearly defined and portrayed in the Shah's government its desirable government, which as already mentioned is the government supporting all strata of capital in the country; and Lt is precisely such government that imperialism has attempted, and is attempting, to re-establish (though not necessarily in its previous form). In this way, the tactical conformity of monopoly capital's positions with those of the liberal bourgeoisie was a passing conformity, and a result of monopoly armed insurrection provided the grounds for an ever quicker agreement. But the Uprising turned this bourgeoisie's nightmare into reality and, despite being left incomplete, extensively demonstrated its effects on the governmental apparatus granted to the liberal bourgeoisie. An ever faster move was there-fore placed on the agenda of the bourgeoisie and imperialism to discover that final form of political leadership which could this time recognize the uprising as a reality.

The Bazargan's government did not take over the levers of power intact, nor did it take delivery of obedient, contented and unarmed workers and toilers. Hence, the renovation of these levers, disarming of the masses and securing their obedience of the government, was again turned into the practical task of the bourgeoisie. This government, however, as it was also shown in practice, could not be the government of the liberal bourgeoisie. By their bloody insurrection, the masses thwarted the plot of ending the revolution, and intended for its continuation. This automatically offset the role of the liberal bourgeoisie, making evident the need for the re-interference of "the leadership of the revolution", and in particular, Ayatollah Khomeini himself, to bridle the revolution.

A bourgeois-liberal government, enjoying the moral support of the petty-bourgeois "leader-ship", could have operated as an effective instrument in putting an end to the revolution, only if the circumstances did not lead co an insurrection. But, the insurrection took place, and the conformity of monopoly capital's position with that of the liberal bourgeoisie, too, came inevitably to an end. For, when the masses broke up the agreed relations between the forces and constituent parts of the camp of the counter-revolution, these forces also inevitably regarded the agreements between them as dissolved, and set out again to achieve a new point of compromise, based on new realities, and undoubtedly with new expectations (the exception being the liberal bourgeoisie which was for a relatively long time confused and astonished on the violation of the agreement by the others). "The numerous centres of power", this nightmare of the liberal-bourgeois such as Bazargan and Bani-Sadr, before being a manifestation of the self-existent rivalry among the bourgeois political forces to attain a greater share in political power, was the product of the stroke delivered by the Uprising upon their agreements. Monopoly capital, in particular, rapidly understood this reality, i.e. the determining effect of the Uprising on the concrete political conditions in the society, and resumed its attempt to find that specific political force which would be prepared, more than all others, to bridle the revolution after an insurrection which had led to the arming of the masses and the expansion of the exercise of their direct will.

This political force could only be the petty-bourgeois current which had until the compromise the leadership of the movement in its hand, namely the clergy and Ayatollah Khomeini at its head; a force which completely took hold of the bridle of the petty-bourgeoisie and in particular its traditional section; a force which, on the one hand, was wholeheartedly interested in suppressing the revolution which was about to demonstrate, more clearly and inevitably in a revolutionary ideological framework, its anti-imperialist content, and on the other hand, enjoyed an extensive influence among the revolutionary masses, enabling it to accomplish the monopoly capital's desirable counter-revolutionary role; in one word, it was a force which wanted to, and could, attack the revolution under the name of revolution. Therefore monopoly capital and the petty-bourgeois leadership both took a new step forward in the same direction, whereas the liberal bourgeoisie which was, as at the Shah's time, lagging a phase behind in analyzing the concrete conditions in the society, insisted on, and recalled, the items of the contract, advocating the necessity of remaining faithful to them. The rise of the IRP as the standard-bearer of the suppression of the revolution was the product of this common direction taken by monopoly capital and the petty-bourgeois leadership; and the unstable governments of Bazargan and Bani-Sadr were the reflection of the political naivety of the liberal bourgeoisie. Once again, and this time even with the formation of the cabinet, the liberal-bourgeois were placed in the opposition, whereas monopoly capital by temporary substitution of the clergy's influence, and in particular that of Ayatollah Khomeinie among the confused masses, for [Shah's] Guard corps and Rangers, and from the position of strength, set out to pursue the policies of Oveisi, Azhari, Rahimi and Bakhtiar[3]. Right here we must emphasize that the extent to which the clergy and in particular Ayatollah Khomeinie himself are aware of their instrumental role in the service of the suppression of the revolution and re-establishment of the indisputable sway of monopoly capital, is by no means a deter-mining factor. The signs of the awareness in Ayatollah Khomeinie are much less evident than in the likes of Beheshties and Khameneis and Ayats; the IRP, which is a combination of the latter group, reflects in its policies a much more conscious conformity with the needs of monopoly capital (we shall explain this conformity in detail in the next parts). What is important is the understanding of the direction of the movement of capital in the sphere of politics, and thereby, the under-standing of the new manifestations of the conflicts within the bourgeoisie.

The separation of monopoly capital from the liberal bourgeoisie, after a short period of tactical unity, and its tendency to hide behind those currents enabling it to employ the influence of the petty-bourgeois leader-ship in the service of the suppression of the Iranian revolution and maintain the camp of the counter-revolution, are the manifest feature of the policy of imperialism after the Uprising. In our belief, the IRP — as a political organ and not necessarily its individual members — is precisely an instrument serving this specific policy of monopoly capital. Hence, any kind of analysis of the present political situation which assesses the moves of the petty bourgeoisie and the clergy leading it, merely on the basis of the Iranian petty-bourgeoisie's interests in itself, or on the self-existent interests of its politicians and leaders, has gone astray. Such deviations go so far that, in the analysis of the conflicts between the factions of the government — a government that we all agree upon its service to capital and its enmity to the proletariat — the question is wholly presented as a struggle between the potty-bourgeois and the bourgeois factions of the government, and thus monopoly capital, this consistent and ever present enemy of our revolution, is either left out entirely of the internal conflicts of the bourgeoisie, or is quietly turned into one of the clients of Bani-Sadr's faction (the liberal bourgeoisie). Whereas in our belief, monopoly capital , With the particular instrumental role it has prepared by the aid of the IRP for the clergy, Ayatollah Khomeini and the backward masses of the petty bourgeoisie, and the liberal bourgeoisie, which following the agreements of the winter of 57 (1979-Ed) as well as Bani-Sadr's success in the presidential elections, despite all its passivity and discredit, takes hold of the executive and governmental organs, still constitute the two sides of the struggle within the bourgeoisie; the only difference being that this time the policies, slogans and methods employed in this struggle have to a great extent changed.

Hence, if until before the February Uprising, monopoly capital in :he course of its retreat was temporarily in a tactical unity with the liberal bourgeoisie, after the Uprising, when the suppression of the revolution under the name of revolution and with the mobilization of the broad masses of the petty-bourgeoisie became a practical need of the counter-revolution, a tactical unity was brought forth temporarily between monopoly capital and the petty-bourgeoisie's counter-revolutionary leadership; thus the IRP which was the organisational instrument of this new unity, turned into the main lever of monopoly capital in suppressing the revolution. But, does this mean that the liberal bourgeoisie is drawn into contradiction with the aims of monopoly capital in as far as Iran's economy and revolution is concerned? Not at all. The root of the conflicts and disagreements between monopoly capital and the bourgeois-liberal faction of the government lies not in their aims but in their methods. We shall discuss this question in detail in the next parts, and are here content with mentioning some general points: The Iranian liberal bourgeoisie, in the course of one and a half years being in the position of administering the executive duties of the accumulation of capital as well as maintaining and consolidating the productive order, has step by step understood the role played in this respect by the Shah's government in the service of all strata of the bourgeoisie. The ideological separation of the non-monopoly bourgeoisie of Iran from the government it has lost (this compassionate guardian appointed by the imperialist monopolies) has more than ever lessened. Today, the Iranian non-monopoly bourgeoisie more than ever clearly under-stands its deep link with imperialism and with its long term objectives in Iran. This understanding, this bourgeoisie's deep hatred for revolution, has been frequently asserted in various terms by Bazargan, Bani-Sadr, and their colleagues. If, however, the liberals are today acquiring the necessary political intelligence to understand and admit the long-term objectives of imperialism in Iran, they cannot, as the representatives of non-monopoly capital, conceal their anxiety about the methods adopted by monopoly capital to revive the "good old days". For non-monopoly capital, the revolution was a painful course of destruction of the foundations of profit making and the accumulation of the foundations of profit making and the accumulation of its capital. In contrast to the imperialist monopolies, non-monopoly capital does not possess the economic capacity of enduring such as long period of anarchy in production. Hence, "that is enough! The productive order must be ever more quickly restored". But, as to how this aspiration could come true, bourgeois-liberalism still suffers from its illusions, illusions which undoubtedly reflect its shaky passive and limited economic base. Whilst monopoly capital, as we already said, has based its long-term move for the restoration of this productive order upon organising the camp of the counter-revolution and attempting to establish a counter-revolutionary order — a policy which can temporarily be in contradiction with production and its order — the liberal bourgeoisie, whose point of departure is the daily accumulation of capital in the domestic market, tries to stride over these necessary and practical, but painful and expensive steps. The liberal bourgeoisie demands the end of revolution without the realistic organisation of the counter-revolution, or at least without the best method of its organisation, and thus, being drawn in its illusions, once again comes into contradiction with the farsightedness of the imperialist monopolies. If until before the Uprising, the two monopoly and liberal factions within the bourgeoisie were bargaining on the way and extent of bunging about changes in the form of government, after the uprising these bargainings were carried on around the ways and methods of suppressing the revolution. However, a detailed elaboration of this discussion should be left to the next part.

Let us summarize what we have so far said:

In our belief, neither of the two factions existing in the present government are the direct representatives of the whole of the interests of monopoly capital — and thereby the ultimate saviours of the bourgeoisie — in our country. Seek representatives can only be the product of that political synthesis we already pointed out. And as long as the necessary and adequate conditions for the emergence of this synthesis (the third alternative), on the basis of a certain relationship between the two camps of the revolution and the counter-revolution, are not provided, such representatives will not be put forward by monopoly capital in the practical arena of politics. Today, monopoly capital has not presented a direct and fully qualified representative against the representatives of the other strata of the bourgeoisie (including the petty-bourgeoisie), but, whilst preparing the grounds for its direct representatives to appear in the scene, is essentially pursuing its policy by means of the existing ruling body with the existing composition. The conflicts within the ruling body and the political struggles among the factions are above all a reflection of the attempts by monopoly capital in organising the suppression of revolution on the one hand, and in regaining political hegemony in the ranks of the bourgeoisie by rejecting liberalism and advocating its independent alternative on the other hand. Whilst both factions of the ruling body are operating, in the hands of monopoly capital, as effective, complementary and irreplaceable instruments in confronting the revolution, and thus, at this specific Juncture, possess a vital role for imperialism, both must be driven back in the face of the growth of the genuine alternative of monopoly capital; they must operate without being consolidated.

That is why we call both factions existing in the government as bourgeois-imperialist, without regarding either of them as the direct representative and the desirable and ultimate alternative of monopoly capital. Neither theocracy advocated by the IRP, which is a cover to legitimize the policy of fierce suppression of the masses, nor Liberalism advocated by Bani-Sadr's faction, which is a new lever for bourgeois demagogy and justification of the crimes of the regime and a means to defend the capitalist order of production, would provide the governmental superstructure of capital in the event of its victory over the revolution. However, they are both, in practice, the constituents of a single counter-revolutionary policy. As long as the third alternative is not brought forth and the grounds for its emergence are not provided, the bourgeoisie would not be able to rid itself of these differences. Rather, it is precisely these very differences that on the one hand enable the present factions in the ruling body to play their particular role at the present juncture, and on the other hand, create the necessity and possibility of the rise of a political synthesis.

These differences are neither accidental nor fabricated, but thoroughly reflect the reality and nature of the two factions existing in the camp of the counter-revolution. The IRP and Bani-Sadr's faction, on the basis of their nature, on the basis of what they are, occupy a place in the general policy of imperialism. Hence, in order to analyze how each of them fulfils their place in this policy, a matter which is our main objective in approaching their differences, we must first take a look at the positions and the class bases of the positions of these two currents on the questions facing the counter-revolution. We have summarized these questions into two fundamental questions:

How must the revolution be suppressed? And, how must the accumulation of capital be resumed?

Therefore, for assessing the two factions, and in fact, for explaining and elaborating what we only mentioned in this part, and also for making clear the communist attitude towards the two factions, we first start with the examination of the position each of the two takes on these two questions.


[1] "Aryamehr" was Shah's title. So the term refers to the kind of systematically institutionised and stable repressive conditions under the Shah. —Ed.

[2] Reference is made to the slogans of the National Front (the ancestors of the present liberals) during the Shah's Land Reform. —Ed.

[3] Shah's military men and premier during the months before the Feb. Uprising. —Ed.

Two Factions
Within the Bourgeois-Imperialist Counter-Revolution

Part II
Extracted from: Besooy-e-Sosyalism No.2 August 1980

In the last part, we stated that the internal conflicts of the government are the reflexion of disagreement within the bourgeoisie, between the monopoly and non-monopoly bourgeoisie, over methods of con-fronting the revolution and strengthening the foundations of imperialist production and exploitation. We also said that it is only the monopoly bourgeoisie's policy that can lead the entire bourgeoisie to unity under its banner. But, in the absence of the genuine and direct political representatives of the monopoly bourgeoisie, who were driven out of the practical scene of politics by the revolution in general and the February Uprising in particular, the policy of the imperialist monopolies could only be propagandised and pursued by the existing government, and on the basis of function of its different factions. This means that:

    1) Neither of the present factions of government are the direct, genuine and stable representatives of monopoly capital; and the reappearance of these representatives in the practical scene of politics requires certain objectives and subjective grounds to be brought about in the society in general and within the bourgeoisie in particular. The monopoly bourgeoisie is striving to provide these objective and subjective conditions.

    2) The conformity of the policy of the imperialist reaction with the factions of the government is a temporary conformity which et every juncture assumes its expression mainly in the policies of one of the existing factions. Until before the Uprising, when the question for imperialism was the ever more protection of the governmental apparatus from the threat of the revolutionary masses' offensive, the imperialist reaction was tactically in unity with the liberal bourgeoisie. After the Uprising, when the need for adopting the policy of "suppression of the revolution under the name of revolution" was placed on the agenda of imperialism, the monopoly bourgeoisie put into force its policy mainly through that religious petty-bourgeois current which until the winter of 57 (1979-Ed) had undertaken the leadership of the mass movement, and then, right from before the Uprising had completely turned away from revolution and adhered to imperialist reaction. The Islamic Republican Party is the product and the agent of this reactionary tactical unity after the Uprising, and the policy prevailing in this Party, as a single political organ and not a collection of individuals and circles, is the policy of the imperialist monopolies.

    3) Thus the struggle within the ruling body is the reflexion of the struggle between the monopoly and the non-monopoly bourgeoisie over the attainment of political hegemony in the camp of the counter-revolution, without being at the same time the struggle between the class organisations of these two strata of the bourgeoisie. The IRP is not the class organisation of the monopoly bourgeoisie, but is a temporary political instrument for the latter. Nor could Bani-Sadr's faction, which basically lacks an organisational structure, be regarded as the class organisation of the non-monopoly bourgeoisie. Therefore, the consolidation of the monopoly bourgeoisie's hegemony within the bourgeoisie does not only imply the unity of the ranks of the bourgeoisie under the banner (program, tactics and methods) of monopoly capital, but also implies the emergence of the real political organisation of monopoly capital. Hence, we consider the product of the struggles within the government as to be a political synthesis within the bourgeoisie, for we assess the final result of these conflicts as not the unilateral supremacy of one of the existing factions over the other, survival and consolidation of one and the destruction of the other, but the emergence of that third force which would undertake the direct, genuine and stable representation of the monopoly bourgeoisie.

Here, we reach the second question we posed in the last part, that is, what ideological and political features and aspects must this single leadership of the bourgeoisie possess? Or, in more precise terms, which features and aspects of the two present factions must be maintained, expanded and promoted in this third force, and which aspects and features must be negated and discarded?

Before answering this question, and in order to do so more clearly, it is necessary to mention a point:

Our understanding of the two factions of the ruling body up to this point clearly makes evident its difference with the perception prevailing in the communist movement which recognises the IRP as the political representative of the petty-bourgeoisie — or the traditional petty-bourgeoisie — and thus assess the axis of internal differences of the government as being the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the petty- bourgeoisie over power. Our effort in this article is to present our views positively, and not in a polemical manner. However, let us here pose this question that how basically Marxists must make their decision on the class character of the IRP? By assessing the economic situation and productive position of those strata and individuals who take part in the IRP's action? By assessing the economic situation and productive position of the IRP's cadres and activists? By attempting to discover documents shoving the financial and executive connection of the IRP and/or its members with certain bourgeois and petty-bourgeois circles? By believing in whatever the IRP says about itself? By assessing the class alignment of "Islam" in general, or that of "clergy" again in general? No doubt that the answer to all these questions is: No. Marx has given the key to solve the problem:

"What makes them representatives of the petty-bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds they do not get behind the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drives the latter practically. This is, in general, the relationship between the political and literary representatives of a class and the class they represent."         (K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte)

In this article, we can not deal with all "problems and solutions" to which the IRP "are driven". However, in this limited framework of the discussion of the two factions, and in examining the attitude of the two factions towards the fundamental problems placed before the counter-revolution, we, among other things, shall try to show that the IRP not only in its policies goes further than the problems and methods of the petty-bourgeoisie in its actual existence, but persistently endeavour (and this endeavour makes up the raison d'Γͺtre of the IRP) to carry further with itself the petty-bourgeoisie up to the point of conformity with the policy of imperialism against our revolution. If we succeed to show this point, we have reached the half way — and only halfway — of the concrete explanation of class character of the IRP, for we have shown that with which specific class interests the policies prevailing in the IRP lie coinciding. But, this very step would suffice to question the notion that regards the IRP as the representative of the petty-bourgeoisie.

We summarised the fundamental problems facing the counter-revolution as follows: 1) How must the revolution be suppressed? 2) How must imperialist exploitation, and on whose basis, the accumulation of capital, be resumed in the society? What are the general outlines of the policies of the factions within the ruling body regarding these problems?

1) The suppression of the revolution

The fate of the revolution is pledged on the formation and ultimate confrontation of the two camps of the revolution and the counter-revolution. What do the two factions of the ruling body contemplate over the course of formation and development of these two camps, and over the strong and weak points of each one? And what practical guide-lines they place before the bourgeoisie?

The present epoch is the epoch of proletarian revolutions, the epoch of moribund capitalism and the epoch of revolutionary struggle of toiling masses of the world against imperialism. Even where these struggles take shape in the framework of democratic struggles, the proletariat constitutes its backbone and the main motivating force. Marxism-Leninism, as the revolutionary ideology of the proletariat in the present epoch, is indisputably the most coherent and consistent revolutionary ideology of our time. The communist movement, by a general definition, has constituted, and is constituting, the active section of most of the revolutionary struggles of the twentieth century. The counter-revolutionary policy of imperialism in our time generally, and in our revolution particularly, must be adapted to this reality and relied on the suppression of the proletarian movement and extermination of its conscious vanguards throughout the world; and it has been so for a long time. Anti-communism is the essential pillar of the policy of imperialism in the present epoch; and any anti-communist force, irrespective of its social and class base, in the final analysis, operates towards accomplishing the policy of imperialism.

The IRP is in complete, overt and direct conformity with this fundamental component of the policy of imperialism (i.e. anti-communism), to the extent that this general content of the policy of imperialism makes up the specific motive of the movement and the raison d'Γͺtre of this Party. The IRP consistently calls upon the bourgeoisie to adopt the policy of suppressing and exterminating the workers' and communist movement, and whenever the bourgeoisie, for different reasons, exhibits negligence in doing so, the IRP itself directly employs its utmost effort, using its organisational facilities, to accomplish this policy from the above of the bourgeoisie and its government. The IRP clearly and out-rightly shows to the bourgeoisie the main battle-front. From this point of view, the IRP is the loud speaker of monopoly capital in the agitation and propaganda for its most fundamental counter-revolutionary policy (i.e., anti-communism).

The proletarian movement and communism, as the pillars of the anti-imperialist revolutions of the present epoch, must be suppressed": this is the message of monopoly capital to the Iranian bourgeoisie, a message which is openly reflected in the policy, methods and daily practice of the IRP. Therefore, insofar as the main motivating force of our anti-imperialist revolution and that political leadership who in the final analysis can, and must, unite the camp of the revolution under its banner and lead it to victory, are concerned, the IRP has no illusion and does not cause any illusions in the camp of the counter-revolution. The IRP well recognises the point of strength of the camp of the revolution — that is the active presence of the revolutionary proletariat and its communist vanguard — in our country and in our revolution. This is a cognition that monopoly capital and its political representatives have for a long time reached, and the IRP, from the view point of political "far-sightedness" in this connection, not only goes beyond the petty-bourgeoisie but in reality has nothing less than the likes of Kissinger and Berzensky.

The complementary of this fundamental understanding of the camp of the revolution, is another fundamental understanding concerning the requirements of the formation and organisational build-up of the camp of the counter-revolution. Anti-communism, from the viewpoint of monopoly capital and especially in the dominated country, has an unbreakable link with the rejection of bourgeois liberalism. As we have frequently explained in our other writings, in the dominated country, where the tendency of monopoly capital to maintain and strengthen political reaction must inevitably acquire its overall and complete manifestation, liberalism is not a reliable and favourable political superstructure. In such countries, the imperialist overt violence and reaction is, in the final analysis, the most suitable way that capital of the epoch of imperialism knows to establish its sway. Bourgeois liberalism, which stands for concurrent class dictatorship and counsellorship within the bourgeoisie, is by no means compatible with the long term needs of the accumulation of capital in the dominated country. The tendency of capitalism of the epoch of monopolies to political reaction, turns the bourgeois-liberal outlook in the dominated country into a relic, which only in certain instances and within a specific and limited framework could it acts as a politico-ideological instrument in the service of the bourgeoisie.

In the present epoch and in our country, the bourgeois liberals are the most confused politicians of the bourgeoisie. They are of some use to capital only insofar as illusion-making is itself a political instrument. This is precisely the role that until the Uprising the liberal bourgeoisie of Iran had undertaken in order to bridle the revolution which was about to endanger the sway of the entire bourgeoisie. But, where these bourgeois-liberal illusions go beyond this, and the bourgeois-liberals put forward and insist upon the concurrent class dictatorship and inner-class democracy as the superstructure of capitalist society in Iran, monopoly capital itself, before anybody else, declares their political bankruptcy. In the imperialist countries, liberalism enjoys specific objective bases; bases which themselves, first and foremost, rely on the decline of liberalism in the dominated country. Hence, the bourgeois-liberals in Iran must recognise their place, not fly high, and admit the existence of "unilateral centralism- and the exercise of the leadership of monopoly capital in the ranks of the bourgeois counter-revolution as well as in the political sway of capital over labour. The inner unity of the bourgeois counter-revolution itself requires convincing and/or shutting up the liberal bourgeoisie. It also requires making the bourgeoisie understand the need for adopting the policy of "over violence under the leadership of monopoly capital". In con-fronting the revolution, the whole of the bourgeoisie undoubtedly becomes aware of the necessity of the unity of its ranks. But, those bourgeois political forces are "wise" and "conscious" to the interests of the entire class, who recognise this unity as possible not by means of "inner-class democracy" and representation of all strata of the bourgeoisie in political power, but by the rejection of liberalism and indisputable acceptance of the political leadership of monopoly capital in the entire class.

The IRP well reflects in itself this "wisdom" of the monopolies. Today, the IRP advances this "impatient" centralism and this undeniable necessity of overt violence. The widespread attempt by the IRP to weaken the bases of the liberals' power, and also to limit the liberal methods of government, is another evidence of the conformity of this Party's operation with the general policy of imperialism in creating the grounds for organisation of the ranks of the bourgeoisie. The operation of the IRP is compatible with this undeniable reality that the smallest democratic openings and the slightest procrastination by the bourgeoisie and its government to revive Aryamehrian repression would pave the way for the revolutionary proletariat and provide the grounds for its growth in political consciousness and class organisation. The operation of the IRP is compatible with this reality that, that force which more than others benefits from the adoption of liberal methods on the part of the bourgeois government, and even from existence of open contradiction in it which [may] result in failure or wavering in accomplishing its suppressive duties, is the young communist movement. The operation of the IRP is compatible with this reality that for any moment that the communists can be able to enjoy the open conditions for their agitational, propaganda and politico-organisational activity, the bourgeoisie gets hundreds of steps closer to its downfall, and the consolidation of its class sway becomes hundreds of times more difficult. Therefore, the IRP refuses beforehand the adoption of those laws which, even in form, remains silence with regard to the anti-worker, anti-communist and anti-democratic violence, and where under the pressure of the masses' democratism, the liberals exhibits wavering, or taken on a peaceful appearance to attract conciliators in the ranks of the revolutionary movement, the IRP itself, from outside of all laws and promises, and even at the expense of making evident the internal conflicts of the politicians of the class, assigns the black-bandist thugs to make up for the past.

But, what does Bani-Sadrism say in this respect? This tendency, too, is undoubtedly an anti-communist tendency in its essence and from top to bottom. However, contrary to the IRP which unveils for the bourgeoisie the undeniable reality of our revolution, shows the bourgeoisie the main fronts of the battle and tries to convince it on its openly suppressive tasks as regards the workers' and communist movement, Bani-Sadrism which in essence is nothing but bourgeois-liberal in an opportunist compromise with methods of religious expression, downplays for the bourgeoisie the role and place of the revolutionary proletariat and its revolutionary ideology, Marxism-Leninism. Bani-Sadrism infuses the bourgeoisie with a politico-ideological self-confidence and also with false and utopian economic ideas that can by no means be realised in our country, as a country dominated by imperialism. If the IRP, by relying on economic, political and ideological realities of capitalism of the present epoch in general and that of our country in particular, tries to convince the bourgeoisie of Iran on the necessity of the ever more decisive participation in the counter-revolutionary and class struggle against the revolutionary proletariat, Bani-Sadrism claims that there exist such economic, political and ideological grounds in the society that supposedly enables the bourgeoisie to alleviate the class struggle.

The IRP starts from the perception of the features of capitalism of the epoch of imperialism in the dominated country, recognising the main enemy of the bourgeoisie, that is the revolutionary proletariat and Marxism-Leninism, and discerning the objective and subjective grounds of its growth. Bani-Sadrism, on the contrary, covers up these features and exaggerates in the economic, political and ideological capabilities of the Iranian bourgeoisie in confronting the proletariat. The starting point of Bani-Sadrism is the observation of the successes of the bourgeoisie of imperialist countries of Western Europe and America, but it does not understand the objective bases of these successes, and naively sees as possible the realisation of similar conditions in Iran. Bani-Sadrism assures the Iranian bourgeoisie that there exist favourable economic grounds to alleviate the struggles of the proletariat and non-proletarian toilers against capital in Iran. The economic proscription that Bani-Sadr wraps for the bourgeoisie of Iran, a prescription that is supposed to sweep under the feet of the communist movement, is a utopian prescription which has by no means taken into account the specific economic place of Iran as a dominated country. Bani-Sadrism is the advocate of the thesis "national and independent economy" within the bourgeoisie, and precisely the same as the opportunist tendency in the communist movement, regards the objective basis of bourgeois democracy in the present epoch as being "economic independence" and not imperialist exploitation.

The division of the countries of the world into imperialist and dominated, imperialist exploitation of the toilers of the dominated countries, imperialist super-profits of the monopolies by means of the export of capital, the emergence and continuance of labour aristocracy in the imperialist countries, the dominance of revisionism and trade-unionism in the communist and workers' movement of these countries, are all necessary and inter-connected links which secure the possibility of bourgeois democracy and liberalism to appear in the imperialist countries. Bani-Sadrism covers up these realities, and precisely the same as the imperialist ideologues of the countries of Western Europe and America, presents this "liberal capacity" of the bourgeoisie of the metropolitan countries, as the effect of its independence and industrial flourishing", democratic culture and tradition and Its "free debate".

Bani-Sadrism, as a fully-fledged bourgeois-liberal tendency, is the echo of the extensive anti-communist propaganda with which the bourgeoisie of the metropolitan countries bombards the proletariat of these countries. For the bourgeoisie of Iran, the creation of the objective grounds for adopting liberal methods in politics generally and in government particularly requires Iranian capital-Ism to become imperialist; and this, though not an analytical impossibility is a class-historical impossibility. Liberalism in the epoch of imperialism relies on the fierce exploitation of the toilers of the dominated countries, and the liberals precisely covers up this exploitation. Bani-Sadrism is a defender of capital, and where the toilers of Iran are about to discern capitalism as the cause of all their sufferings, it rises to its feet so as to basically deny the existence of capitalist economy and sometimes even "economy" in Iran, calling to witness implicitly the situation in Western Europe and introducing this situation as the "real" capitalist society. Further, it attempts to propagandize, in the cover of its absurd phrase-mongering, the desirability of establishing this system in an "independent and self-reliant" way, "Touhidi"[4] way, etc, in the face of the revolutionary proletariat and communism which explain the necessity of overthrowing this rotten system.

It is natural that the propagation of such illusions among the masses of workers and toilers has a significant place for imperialism; otherwise, Bani-Sadrism would not have been of any use for the bourgeoisie. But, it is to the same extent natural and necessary that the bourgeoisie itself would not set its hopes on these illusions and would not insist on their realization. Hence, Bani-Sadrism is the defender of the general foundations of capitalist economy against the revolutionary proletariat's critique, and not the direct and outright expression of the desirable policy of the bourgeoisie in a given country and at a given juncture. Such a current can have no use but to play the role of an instrument of deceit for the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, though Bani-Sadr's liberal propaganda is in essence nothing but a deceit, in form, it is expressive of a utopia; for the bourgeoisie, basically, cannot deceive the workers except by putting forward its utopias and by concealing the reality of its class interests. Therefore, it would not be wrong to call Bani-Sadrism "bourgeois utopianism", even if Bani-Sadr himself and all his colleagues and aids are, in private, aware of the absurdity of their theories and propaganda.

Likewise, in the ideological political sphere, Bani-Sadrism advocates a -utopian" and unrealistic attitude towards the communist movement. Bani-Sadrism is an advocate of suppression as the bourgeoisie's ultimate solution; a club which would appear from behind of every "free debate". And precisely where the deceits of the government have proved ineffective, as in revolutionary Kurdistan, the two factions reach a consensus on the policy of suppression and its significance for the bourgeoisie. But, Bani-Sadrism, on the whole, primarily demands liberalism to be placed at the axis of the bourgeoisie's policy, and violence is regarded as the executive guarantor of this liberalism. Regarding the attitude towards the communist movement, Bani-Sadrism demands the adoption of liberal methods with the purpose of strengthening the ranks of opportunism in this movement, isolating and suppressing revolutionary Marxism. Nevertheless, this policy is inevitably presented on the part of Bani-Sadr's faction in the society, not in an overt and outright form, but in the form of a demand for ideological confrontation and "free debate" with Marxism as a whole. And such an attitude inevitably stirs up an illusion as regards the politico-ideological ability of the Iranian bourgeoisie in confronting communism.

Yes, if the communist movement is overcome economically, it would be possible to confront it at political and ideological level. If opportunism in the communist movement enjoys a firm material basis economically, it would not be an improbable prospect to isolate and drive back revolutionary Marxism. Here, too, the question is over this very if. Bani-Sadrism, therefore, completes its economic utopia with the deceitful theory of "free debate and exchange of ideas". While the bourgeoisie of Iran is about to understand the weakness of its liberal representatives in political and ideological confrontation with the Iranian communist movement (in spite of all its problems and shortcomings), and grasp the necessity of physical struggle with the communist movement, Bani-Sadrism come to the scene to defeat in the free debate the communist movement and the revolutionary ideology of the proletariat before the anxious eyes of the bourgeoisie.

The discussion is not here on the extent to which Bani-Sadr and his faction is "consistent" in putting to force such promises, but it is on the dispersion which is stirred up within the bourgeoisie by even declaring these methods as being desired by this class. Even in the metropolitan countries, where imperialism has access to the rich heritage of theoretico-ideological work produced by centuries of endeavour by the intellectuals of the bourgeoisie, it has for long given up intellectual confrontation with communism. Instead, it has' resorted to distorting, falsifying and censorship alongside with — what is the principal course of action - suppressive confrontation. It is, therefore, quite clear that the Bani-Sadr's policy of "free debate" as regards Marxism is no more than inviting the bourgeoisie to "ideological martyrdom Bani-Sadrism or any bourgeois ideology of the present epoch, would not have the capability of ideological confrontation with revolutionary Marxism, and any illusion and self-confidence in this regard, however temporary and passing it may be, would be deadly for the bourgeoisie. In our view, therefore, in this regard too, the IRP opens up much clearly the realities of the class struggle, before the eyes of the Iranian bourgeoisie.

This problem extends itself to the political sphere. Contrary to the explicit line of the IRP, Bani-Sadrism demonstrates its failure in understanding the relationship between democracy and the struggle of the proletariat for socialism. That the communists grow better and faster in the conditions of underground work in comparison with the conditions of open work, that the more they are suppressed, the more powerful they become, are statements based on a fallacy. Contrary to the IRP, Bani-Sadrism does not recognize the cause of the growth of the communist movement, which is nothing but the validity of the viewpoints and the programs of this movement and their conformity with the class interests of the proletariat, and/or covers it up. The IRP exerts all its efforts to limit the scope of the communist's use of the open conditions for widespread and fast propaganda and agitation for their program and demands. On the contrary, Bani-Sadrism suffers from the illusion that bourgeois liberalism can stand against Marxism in the open conditions, and that driving the communists to the domain of underground activity takes away this possibility form the bourgeoisie. Bani-Sadrism does not comprehend this fact that any democratic achievement in the society serves most effectively the Iranian proletariat, and that the active presence of the proletariat and the communist movement in the democratic revolution has essentially no aim but to create the democratic pre-requisites for the final move towards socialism. Bani-Sadrism is inattentive to the pressing need of the Iranian bourgeoisie to deprive the communist movement of the field of open activity and, in this regard too, remains incapable of the precise recognition of the interests of capital in Iran in the epoch of imperialism.

Thus, we see that the two factions of the ruling body have a common point of departure with regard to confronting the proletarian movement and revolutionary Marxism. Both are the sworn enemies of communism. But, the IRP considers the policy of all-round suppression as the only road to survive the bourgeoisie, while Bani-Sadrism regards this policy as an ultimate solution which must be resorted to only "in the event" of the failure of bourgeois-liberal policies and methods. The IRP, therefore, set out to purge the liberal bourgeoisie and liberal methods from government and political leadership of the bourgeoisie, whereas Bani-Sadrism places supporting and strengthening it on its agenda. From the viewpoint of the interests of monopoly capital, it is the IRP which has clearly understood the problem, and it is Bani-Sadr who is off. The IRP is "realistic" and Bani-Sadr's faction is "confused"; then the IRP must act and pursue its policies in their essence, while Bani-Sadr must fob the masses off with its liberal illusions instead of realities, and decorate the common outcome of [the operation of] the ruling body — which is nothing but an attempt to suppress the revolution with empty liberal phrases.

The attitude of the factions of the ruling body toward communism and consistent democratism of the proletariat on the one hand, and bourgeois-liberalism on the other, clarifies the general framework of their position on forces such as Mojahedin-e-Khalq which oscillate between the two mentioned poles.

The Bani-Sadrist liberalism sees newfangled and "well-thought-of" liberals in the future of the Mojahedin's leaders, who, with a slight alteration, would be ready to turn the past record of revolutionary struggles of their organization and the revolutionary enthusiasm of their young followers into a tool in the bargaining of the non-monopoly bourgeoisie and the imperialist monopolies over economic and political concessions; "well-thought-of" liberals who would help the workers and toiling masses cease struggling and set their hopes on the bourgeois government. If this happens; if a bourgeois-liberal government can in this way attain a social base and political validity, then its political alternative for resolving the problems of the bourgeoisie would acquire a more stronger material basis than that of monopoly capital, and thus the dreadful dream of non-monopoly capital to become deprived of deter-mining its own fate would not come true till a later time. But monopoly capital sees in Mojahedin-e-Khalq, on the one hand, signs of a democraticism which had the potential of following the revolutionary proletariat and its consistent democraticism; and on the other, a force which mixes up the black and white boundaries between the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution and the revolutionary proletariat and its communist van-guards, a force which comes in between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and while in many cases dulls the sharp edge of the revolutionary proletariat's policies against the bourgeois government and parties, and acts as an intermediary in the struggles of the oppressed classes against the imperialist exploitation and oppression, at the same time plays the role of a shock absorber for the communist movement with regard to the suppressive policies of the bourgeoisie. The widespread suppression of the proletarian and communist movement is, therefore, impossible, without at the same time having forces such as Mojahedin-e-Khalq fallen into the abyss of passivity and/or conciliation.

The IRP, which has skilfully linked up the elements of imperialist policy and "fundamentalism", calls the intermediary role of Mojahedin-e-Khalq "ideological eclecticism" and "deviation from Islamic fundamentals"; the Mojahedin are not "fundamentalist", they "oscillate between Islam and communism" and, therefore, hinder the IRP to fulfil its 'fundamentalist" role in the service of imperialism, shedding rivers of blood of revolutionary workers. They must be removed from the way so that imperialism and the IRP could best employ the remnants of the religious convictions of the unconscious masses — and particularly the unconscious masses of the petty-bourgeoisie — in the service of suppressing communist movement and thereby the whole of the revolutionary movement; that is, they could resolutely put into force the summon to "exterminate the infidels"[5] — as they did in Kurdistan, Gonbad and Ahvaz, etc. — without having any trouble from the amendment "have mercy with those in between".

2) The Counter-Revolutionary Order and the Productive Order

The transformation of the economic crisis into a revolutionary crisis, the weakening of the foundations of the sway of capital and the continuance of the revolutionary crisis have, of necessity, pledged the resolution or a considerable abatement of the economic crisis and the resumption of a new cycle of capital accumulation, from the viewpoint of the total social capital, on the suppression of the revolution. That is, in the eye of the total social capital, the suppression of the revolution and the establishment of counter-revolutionary order precede production. It is precisely monopoly capital which, economically, is in a position that, firstly, it is able to recognise this need of the whole of capitalist economy in Iran — that is the precedence taken by counter-revolutionary order over production — and avoid helpless and hasty moves of small and intermediate capitals in the domes-tic market; and secondly, it has such economic capacity that enables it to base its counter-revolutionary policy upon this necessity and make a long-term plan for its movement. Within the domestic market, the individual small capital, which is a small constituent part of the total social capital, starts from the angle of its own narrow and limited interests. For small and intermediate capitals, production and order are indeed identical necessities. For them the desired order is an order which prevents interruption in productive activity and reduces the periods the means of production remain idle to a minimum. In other words, the intended order of these capitals is "productive order", that is the "regular" use of labour by capital.

The lower and intermediate strata of the bourgeoisie, even in the context of a civil war, avail themselves of the opportunity of a cease-fire to keep their business going. But, monopoly capital, which gives direction to the movement of the total social capital in the domestic market, considers the capitalist economy of Iran as a whole and as a constituent part of the world imperialist relations, and thus draws up its policy in the service of maintaining this "economy". For the monopoly bourgeoisie the point is not merely whether there occurs an interruption in the process of reproduction of this, or that stratum of capital; rather, it is whether to preserve or to abandon capitalist production in a given country. Small and intermediate capitals, despite all threats facing the whole of the bourgeoisie on the part of the revolution, equate the concept of "order" with concepts such as security, absence of anarchy, presence of workers at work-places, non-stop running of the factories, so forth, and thus equate order with "ceasing hostilities"; whereas, under such circumstances, monopoly capital, in the first place, considers "order" not from the viewpoint of production, but principally from a socio-political point of view — as an all-sided consolidation of the sway of the counter-revolution and the decisive suppression of the revolution. Monopoly capital, therefore, bases its policy not upon strengthening the police, enacting the labour law, subjecting workers to fines, etc., but rather upon parameters such as the manner of organising the camp of the counter-revolution inside Iran, the balance of forces at the global level, the different governmental alternatives of the bourgeoisie in Iran, the assessment of the prospect of militarization of the Golf, the possibility of the use of armies of the mercenary states in the region, the possibility of partition of Iran, and so forth. The farsightedness of the bourgeoisie is directly proportional to the volume and the turnover period of its capital. So, imperialism - which encompasses the renovation and reproduction of the total social capital and the capitalist social relations in Iran - has by far greater "counter-revolutionary patience" than small and intermediate capitals in the domestic market. Under the existing circumstances in Iran, the monopolies and the imperialist states seek to restore an order which not only is not necessarily occurring the immediate resumption of production, but is in the last analysis a precondition for it. And it is natural that if a temporary disorder, in the context of the monopolies' long-term policy, may practically serve establishing an all-around order desired by the monopolies, they would be the first to cause this disorder in production.

The practice of the IRP indeed confirms this need and capacity of monopoly capital. The IRP out-rightly places priority on an all-around and counter-revolutionary socio-political order rather than resuming production at any cost. The suppression of the revolution is the primary and most vital task that the IRP places before the bourgeoisie, and insists on its accomplishment knowing that it may cost sacrifices in the field of production and accumulation. The IRP is a fully-fledged counter-revolutionary party which defines its tasks not in conjunction with the permanent need of the bourgeoisie to produce value and surplus-value, but with respect to the establishment of such conditions in which the production of value and surplus-value is no longer threatened by the revolutionary movement. Even where the IRP speaks of economy, it pursues a thoroughly political objective. The heads of the IRP one day speak of private property and economic inequality as being holy and natural, and the other day turn to the advocates of economic equality. For the IRP, therefore, economic slogans are a political weapon; politics, counter-revolutionary politics, being their "economic" basis.

But the Bani-Sadrist faction's perception of the concept of order is an abstract perception. Bani-Sadrism, in the first place, looks upon order as productive order. Failure to understand that counter-revolutionary order must precede productive order is expressive of the failure to grasp the specifics of a revolutionary situation. The solution of the economic crisis, form the viewpoint of the bourgeoisie and the total social capital, requires the decisive suppression of the revolution and, as we already stated, monopoly capital, by virtue of its domination over the movement of the total social capital, possesses the necessary economic capacities, scope of action and political farsightedness to adapt its policy to this reality. But Bani-Sadrism's haste to resume production — what is the reflection of the interests of small and intermediate capitals in the domestic market — at times goes even to the extent that causes disturbances In the course of establishing the counter-revolutionary order. Bani-Sadr's faction in many cases considers the resumption of production at the level of society even as a precondition for the restoration of order and security. It is quite true that in the normal and non-critical conditions of capitalist production, in non-revolutionary circumstances, the flourishing of production is directly related to the extent to which the toiling masses have submitted to the bourgeois law and obligations. However, applying the relationship between politics and economy of a non-revolutionary situation to a society which is undergoing a revolutionary crisis, and insisting on it, is only expressive of failure to understand the concrete conditions. Obviously, the priority of counter-revolutionary order to productive order should not be interpreted as politics rakes precedence of economy under the existing circumstances in Iran. Economy always, in the last analysis, determines and conditions the political superstructure. But, that which determines and conditions the course of movement of the forces in the political sphere today In Iran is not the needs of the process of production, but it is the pressure exerted by the economic crisis. It is precisely the economic crisis of capitalism in Iran which dictates to the bourgeoisie the necessity that counter-revolutionary order has precedence over productive order. And Bani-Sadrism which, more than any other trend in the Iranian bourgeoisie, lays stress upon the necessity of taking care of the economic situation, is therefore in practice more than the IRP, inattentive to the specific political preconditions of alleviating and overcoming the economic crisis. Here, too, the medal of "realistic attitude" goes to the IRP, and the medal of "confusion" to Bani-Sadrism.

The disagreement between Bani-Sadr's faction and the IRP over the content of the order which the bourgeoisie needs in the first place, inevitably adds fuel to disagreement over the form of establishing this order. If counter-revolutionary order is distinct from productive order, then the means and the process of establishing and maintaining these two kinds of order should also be different. The waves of revolution have to a great extent smashed and made ineffective the formal instruments of preserving the bourgeois law and order. The instruments and institutions which preserve order in the day to day process of production and reproduction in society, i.e. laws, army and police, bureaucracy, judiciary, etc., precisely due to the revolutionary upsurge, which culminated in the February Uprising, have widely ceased functioning.

That revolution occurred precisely means that the bourgeoisie and imperialism were no longer able to rule by means of the formal instruments and institutions, and with formal methods. The revolution itself was most vividly expressive of the bourgeoisie's need for resorting to new methods; there existed in the society a revolutionary situation as distinct from non-revolutionary and normal conditions as any "realistic" bourgeois policy could not but to take it into account as a reality, even in determining the form of establishing the desired order of the bourgeoisie. This reality, in so far as the attempt by the bourgeoisie to restore and consolidate the bourgeois law and order is concerned, underlines the need of this class to renovate the suppressive machine in a manner corresponding the specific political situation prevailing in the society. Under the revolutionary situation prevailing in the society, the counter-revolution must itself abandon the bourgeoisie's formal laws and principles; that is to say the counter-revolution must act "revolutionary". This is a genuine counter-revolutionary perception to which monopoly capital has for a long time attained, and on which it has based its global policy in regard to the proletarian and national revolutions. Under revolutionary circumstances, the bourgeoisie is no more content with the issuance of circulars, arrests, trials or the use of the police and other official suppressive forces against demonstrations, strikes, assemblies and generally speaking all methods of struggles which may be employed by the camp of the revolution — methods which question all existing rules and laws. Rather, under such conditions, the bourgeoisie calls forth the thoroughly reactionary and right-wing extremist bourgeois parties and gangs in order that they — who are fed in the same manger as the state open or secret police — could also utilize these new methods of struggle but in the interest of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie and the monopolies themselves in many cases organise reactionary demonstrations, strikes and even armed confrontation with their own government.

The IRP exhibits most completely through its policies this understanding — the understanding of the bourgeoisie's need for employing the new methods of struggle. Before seeking to renovate the bourgeoisie's legal institutions of suppression and political domination (laws, army, bureaucracy, judiciary, etc.), the IRP is striving to mobilize those specific class forces and political organs which in the present circumstances are able to operate in a "revolutionary" manner, and as far as possible in the name of revolution. In so doing, the IRP goes to the extent that overtly puts the name of 'revolution" on its counter-revolutionary policies: "cultural revolution", "administrational revolution", "purging" (which as far as the IRP is concerned has no meaning but purging the communists and the revolutionary democrats), are amongst the numerous examples there exist in this respect. The unconscious masses of the petty-bourgeoisie and the clergy taking hold of their bridle provide the best means for organising a vast counter-revolutionary force. The IRP's methods of action too, relies on elements and factors which could best set in motion this vast force in the service of suppressing the revolution. So the IRP makes the best use of the influence of the clergy and Islam in the traditional petty-bourgeoisie and in unconscious masses generally; an influence for the strengthening of which the farsighted monopolies never ceased striving even prior to the Uprising. The petty-bourgeois have their eyes on Khomeini and Islam. Khomeini who owes his respectability among the masses not to Islamic jurisprudence but to his active presence in anti-monarchist struggles, himself ' only adores establishing Velayat-e-Faghih[6] and attaining a privileged position for the clergy in the hierarchy of power. The IRP, therefore, becomes the most "decisive" adhere of the Imam's[7] line in order to conquer his mind and will — which has no contradiction with the temporary interests of the imperialist monopolies — and utilize him for the counter-revolutionary mobilization of the petty-bourgeoisie in the service of the policy of imperialism.

The IRP is not a petty-bourgeois party; it is a party which the imperialist monopolies have established for the petty-bourgeoisie and of which they have given a share to the chief of the clan so as to attract his confidence and thereby be granted full authority. What is "valuable" in Islam, as far as the IRP is concerned, is its anti-communist character on the one hand and Khomeini's adoration for it on the other, and these two in union with one another can easily provide the ideological justifications as well as the mass grounds for the policy of "the suppression of the revolution under the name of revolution". The IRP employs Islam in order to mobilize the confused petty-bourgeois masses and, now to a much less extent, certain strata of the proletariat, against the communist and revolutionary movement, getting support from Khomeini in every step. It is obvious that Islam and Khomeini will gain from the long-term policy of the monopolies and the present IRP's activities no more than what they used to receive under the Shah; for neither Islam nor Khomeini can be the constituent elements of the monopolies' governmental superstructure in Iran.

Hence, it is not surprising that the IRP is "inattentive" to Islam as a "doctrine", and that the IRP not only does not make any effort to teach and propagate this "doctrine", but in many cases has no hesitation to deteriorate its validity and respect among the masses. The IRP's Islam makes quite evident the thoroughly bourgeois content it, of necessity, appropriates in the epoch of imperialism. For the IRP, Islam is not an ideal or a collection of "ideological and philosophical fundamentals", but it is a completely political instrument which must be mobilized for a certain period. So the IRP leaves the worries for the future of Islam, for the weakening of the "faith" of the masses and their abandonment of Islam and for having "empty mosques" to Khomeini, likes of Ali Tehrani, and Mojahedin-e-Khalq. The IRP is seeking to establish nobody's "ideal Islamic Society", rather it is in pursuit of making use of the counter-revolutionary characteristics and ideals of the petty-bourgeoisie which is today defined and understood in the context of Islam of the likes of Khomeini. It is thus, evident that by the termination of the role of the petty-bourgeois masses as the mere numbers in the counter-revolutionary program of imperialism, the IRP's interest in Islam and Khomeini, too, will come to an end, and then the IRP itself will reach the end of its operation as the "Islamic Republican Party". The reliance of the IRP on Islam, Khomeini and the clergy is precisely an example of the counter-revolutionary reliance of monopoly capital on factors, elements and methods which have come about in a revolutionary situation and beyond the formal capabilities of the bourgeoisie.

But Bani-Sadrism, like bourgeois-liberalism generally, looks upon "counter-revolutionary anarchy" with a critical eye, and demands the restoration of order from the formal governmental organs and institutions of the bourgeoisie from an abstract viewpoint ignorant of the specific conditions and realities in the society. It is true that Bani-Sadr too relies on the agitation of broad masses to confront with the camp of the revolution; but, in such doing, Bani-Sadr and his faction are in pursuit of recalling the "legitimacy" of their power so that they then act by means of executive instruments as well as formal and "legal" methods. In other words, while the IRP strives to mobilize the masses themselves as the instrument for suppression, Bani-Sadr intends to employ the masses' support to organize the formal instruments of the bourgeoisie's suppression and sway. The Bani-Sadrists regards the IRP's methods as adding fuel to anarchy and tension in the society, while the IRP in turn regards the Bani-Sadr'a methods as reformist, liberal and non-revolutionary. In reality both are correct. Bani-Sadr's faction, in organising the counter-revolution, acts not in a "revolutionary" but in a liberal and reformistic manner; this method does not work in fulfilling the political needs of the bourgeoisie under the present conditions. But, on the other hand, one can smell from the methods and actions of the IRP the stink of year, of counter-revolutionary experiences by the imperialist monopolies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Bani-Sadrism sticks itself co Islam and Khomeini and strives to interpret both in a bourgeois-liberal framework. In other words, Bani-Sadrism is the product of an inescapable compromise between bourgeois-liberalism and religious forms and elements imposed in the course of revolution. This compromise is, in a sense, the only road to survive liberalism, taking into account the ideological characteristics dominated over the revolutionary movement until the Uprising and over the government afterwards. The fate of Shayegan, Sanjabi, Mogadam-Maraghei, Nazih and recently Madani[8], the National Front and its various factions as a whole, made Bani-Sadrism and its faction for a long while the only channel through which the liberal bourgeoisie could exist. However, it seems as though the Koran's verses and Khomeini's tendencies confirm the IRP's Islam and rapidly expose the Islamic pretensions of the liberal bourgeoisie. While the IRP actively utilizes Islam as a political tool, the liberalism of the Bani-Sadr kind has a passive attitude towards it. This liberalism turns to "Islam" precisely to the extent that the IRP has directly or indirectly imposed a defensive position upon the liberal bourgeoisie and questioned its Islamic convictions.

Naturally, in such conditions an extensive section of the bourgeoisie in the domestic market looks upon the IRP's methods from a Bani-Sadrist outlook. Under the present conditions, these methods largely impede the renovation of productive forces of the society and the revival and reinforcement of the political and executive organs of the bourgeois rule. Monopoly capital regards this as a price to be paid in short-term which will be made up for by the realization of its' long-term aims. Furthermore, economic anarchy and even crisis brings enormous wealth for certain strata of capitalists. A vast stratum of middlemen and big intermediaries of the purchase and sale of public necessities who find hoarding a favourable ground for superb profit-making, the landowners who take advantage of political anarchy to regain the distributed lands, are examples of such economic successes in the midst of political anarchy. Nevertheless, the economic fortunes brought about by the IRP methods benefits not the entire bourgeois class, but only certain strata of it.

In view of what we have stated so far, it becomes clear why we believe that neither of the existing two factions of the ruling body can be the ultimate alternative and class organisation of the Iranian bourgeoisie.

In so far as the role of the liberal bourgeoisie in our country is concerned, we have not advanced in this article, novel specifics for this stratum. Bani-Sadrism is a certain form of bourgeois-liberalism whose characteristics lies in the general framework of liberalism in our country. The only peculiarity of Bani-Sadrism is its religious manner of expression and its ability to adapt to ideological-political forms dominated over the revolutionary movement before the Uprising and over the government afterwards. The failure of the liberal bourgeoisie to present a political and governmental alternative to the bourgeoisie in Iran as en imperialist-dominated country also includes Bani-Sadrism. Our discussion about Bani-Sadr's faction is, therefore, only an emphasis on our former position regarding this stratum of the bourgeoisie. Being in unbreakable union with the operation of imperialism in Iran, bourgeois-liberalism cannot be the central policy of the bourgeoisie under the leadership of the monopoly bourgeoisie with regard to the Iranian revolution, nor can it provide the ideological-political framework of the bourgeoisie's rule in case of the defeat of the revolution.

But the IRP in its turn only play a temporary role for the bourgeoisie. No doubt that the IRP is a determining political instrument for the bourgeoisie in the present situation. But precisely the same characteristics which enable the IRP to play its instrumental role at this juncture, is hindering it to become the class organisation of the monopoly bourgeoisie and thereby acquire a role in the governmental superstructure of the Iranian bourgeoisie in the event of defeat of the revolution. Because, firstly, the IRP has been set up to mobilise the petty-bourgeoisie and activate the individuals and political circles of the traditional petty-bourgeoisie. By the termination of the role of the petty-bourgeoisie as mere numbers, and the start of the bourgeoisie's final drive for an all-out reliance on the formal organs and instruments of its rule, the use of the IRP as a political instrument for the bourgeoisie will also comes to a halt. In other words, the government of the bourgeoisie can only be set up on the basis of the class organisation of the monopoly bourgeoisie. The IRP cannot be such an organisation, nor can it transform to the latter without a fundamental change. Secondly, and in relation with the first, Islam on which the IRP largely relies to play its role cannot be an ideological super-structure corresponding the economic sub-structure of Iran as an imperialist-dominated country. The extensive export of capital and commodities to Iran, the imperialist exploitation of the workers and toiling masses, the place of Iran in the global division of labour by imperialism and the determining role of the imperialist monopolies in the capitalist economy of Iran, demand, in the first place, an "imperialistic culture" — that is the ideological superstructure of the sway of the imperialist monopolies in the dominated country which can justify imperialist exploitation in its most modern forms.

Islam in general, and the IRP's Islam, lays severe restrictions on these cultural needs of bourgeois exploitation by an ideological outlook which accords with the more backward forms of exploitation and production. The cultural existence of Iran prior to the revolution, and that of the countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand as well as numerous dominated countries in Latin America, clearly portray a "culture" which the capitalism of the epoch of monopolies is looking for, and only by essential changes and revisions can Islam adapt itself to this need of imperialism. On the other hand the IRP itself is rapidly destroying the remnants of Islamic beliefs of the masses, removing the last pre-capitalist ideological barriers to the bourgeoisie's drive for a fresh period of capital accumulation — a period which can, and must, be hindered only by the revolutionary movement under the leadership of the proletariat.

Bakhtiar, on behalf of the bourgeoisie, offered the clergy to step aside from the political scene and set up a "Vatican in Qom"[9]; now the IRP is providing the grounds for the realization of this, by suppressing the revolution in the name of theocracy and active participation of the clergy. A clergy which openly accomplishes its task serving the bourgeoisie and against workers and toiling masses, should retire from the political scene from the point of view of both the bourgeoisie and the masses.

Finally, we must point to the existing class composition of the IRP; a composition which exhibits the historically contradictory character of the IRP as to the class interests it pursues on the one hand and the classes and strata it calls upon to rally under its banner on the other hand. On the one hand, the fact that the IRP most consistently serves to suppress the revolution — by such conformity with the needs of the imperialist monopolies and their known and experienced methods at that — can only suggest a virtual union between a lackey current within the IRP and certain imperialist monopolies and states. The existence of middlemen, capitalists and landowners who practically reap economic benefit thanks to the IRP's operation, indeed brings about a more direct connection between them and the IRP. The composition is coupled with the Savakies[10], Rastakhizies[10] and thugs upon whom the IRP is relied for its day to day activities. On the other hand, the close relationship between the IRP and Khomeini and various sections of the clergy, the Islamic and so-called "anti-imperialist" propaganda by the IRP, the IRP's effort to mobilize the petty-bourgeoisie and also the fact that the IRP introduces itself as the heir to the revolution, all serve to draw certain unconscious petty-bourgeois circles to the IRP. In this way, the contradiction which exists in the goals and methods of the IRP, inevitably reflects in its composition; in one corner the assorted spies, middlemen, capitalists and landowners and thugs find shelter, and in another cornet the most backward petty-bourgeois masses and circles. The conflicts between these constituent elements of the IRP, which is now and then made public, add fuel to confusions and illusions about the IRP among the masses, and sometimes even among their vanguards. In any case, this party, with this composition, is not, and cannot be, what is needed by the bourgeoisie to handle the affairs of a society under its sway.

As long as the preludes to the unity of the bourgeoisie under the banner of monopoly capital are not provided, the bourgeoisie desperately needs both factions of the current ruling body. The tasks undertaken by the IRP and Bani-Sadr's bourgeois-liberal faction in the service of the bourgeoisie are not to be accomplished in separation from one another. This lay stress on the bourgeoisie's permanent need for the two methods of suppression and deceit. The policy of suppression without covers of "rightfulness" and "lawfulness", without being justified and concealed by a faction of the bourgeoisie and its politicians, would make evident its overtly terrorist and anti-human nature. The bourgeoisie can only introduce its interests ea the interests of "society" — it cannot organise its oppression and exploitation but in the name of "society".

The IRP cannot seek to suppress the revolutionary workers, massacre the revolutionaries, forcefully occupy Kurdistan and massacre the Kurdish fighters, impose a complete lack of right on the masses, without at the same time these acts being presented and justified in the name of the bourgeois society and its "law", "order" and "security". This is a task undertaken by the liberal bourgeoisie at this juncture. The methods and operation of the IRP, in the absence of this complementary role undertaken by the liberal bourgeoisie, will rapidly isolate it before the masses. The IRP is an agent in hastening the political polarization of the classes and especially in causing the masses to become disillusioned towards the Islamic government of the bourgeoisie. Without the liberal bourgeoisie and its religious and Bani-Sadrist faction, the IRP's methods would draw the bourgeoisie into a premature and all-sided confrontation with the masses; a confrontation which the bourgeoisie would not afford to endure at this juncture. In addition, a long-term Plan of counter-revolutionary activities to take back the gains of the revolution cannot be carried out in the complete absence of an executive centre — the bourgeois State.

Even where an extremist right-wing armed party holds the leadership of the bourgeoisie's activities, the state is a vital need for the bourgeoisie. The particular composition of' the IRP which is in accord with its practical need for mobilizing the backward masses of the petty-bourgeoisie, reduces the technocratic and bureaucratic capacity of the IRP to a minimum. As to running the affairs of a country by means of a broad state bureaucracy, the IRP does not enjoy the necessary facilities and conditions. This is a vacuum which Ls filled up at the present juncture mainly by the bourgeois-liberals. And finally, the liberals have undertaken to generalize the outcome of the counter-revolutionary violence led by the IRP, as achievements of the entire bourgeoisie, consolidating them legally and formally.

While the IRP's thugs practically suppress in the streets the freedom of speech, gathering, publication, etc., while the IRP's mullahs and spokesmen do not for a moment cease to deceive and harass the masses, the liberals have undertaken to make "legal" and formal concessions in the interests of the entire bourgeoisie out of these advances. The attacks by the IRP's thugs against the gatherings of revolutionary opposition, especially those of the communists, against those bookshops selling the papers of the revolutionary groups, against libraries, etc., and daily agitation against the communists and the democratic forces such as Mojahedin-e-khalq, however frequent, widespread and successful they may be, would not turn into political achievements for the entire bourgeoisie unless the bourgeois government, enjoying the grounds these attacks have provided, once and for all proclaims as illegal the gathering, publication and any activity by the revolutionary opposition. It is only in such case that one can say the bourgeoisie as a class has taken a step towards reviving the Aryamehrian repression. Bani-Sadr's faction in the present government has precisely played such a role in numerous cases such as the suppression of revolutionary Kurdistan, the massacre of the revolutionary students and closure of the universities, prohibition of communist papers, declaration of strikes and political gatherings by the revolutionary and communist opposition as being illegal, and so forth.

But on the other hand, liberal deceit and demagogy can never go on, on its own; nor can it make the sole component or even the main component of the bourgeoisie's policy. Those who refer to Bani-Sadr's faction as being "realistic" and define the bourgeois-liberal policies of this faction as being in opposition to the IRP's policies and so the principled policies of the bourgeoisie, are precisely unaware of the very essential fact about liberalism in our country. The defence by Bani-Sadrism of "law" against the IRP's anarchism, and its support for "free debate" against the IRP's love for "club", may "deceive" and/or "draw to compromise" anybody only when the policy of violence and suppression primarily sweeps away form the society the grounds for the establishment of a real democratic law and also the existing actual conditions for free debate — what is already won by the workers and toiling masses through their struggles and bloody insurrection. If Bani-Sadr's faction is able to promise for "law" — imperialist law — and deceive [the masses), if it can promise for "free debate" and "draw" the conciliatory within the revolutionary movement to bargaining, it is because the IRP has been able, in practice, to put into force the "above law" terrorism of the bourgeoisie, suppress without any debate and negotiations and practically violate the freedom of speech and gathering by means of club and at the bayonet-point. A success in the policy of deceit is the reflection of a success in the policy of suppression. Without the IRP, Bani-Sadrism will lose its necessity for the bourgeoisie and its effectiveness in deceiving the masses. The current use of Bani-Sadrism for the bourgeoisie is that while it consolidates and makes formal the practical achievements of the suppression for the bourgeoisie, it drives the growing hatred among the masses towards the other faction, and only to the other faction and not the whole of the bourgeoisie's government, and thus slowing down, on the whole, the process of masses' disillusionment towards the entire government, taking time for imperialism to make preparations for its final solution.

As long as the grounds for the emergence of the third political force which can unify the bourgeoisie have not come about, the two present factions of the ruling body are undeniable components of the bourgeoisie's confrontation with the continuation of revolution. The conflicts of the two factions, must, of necessity, be controlled at any Juncture so as not to endanger the basis of the unity of the entire ruling body. As long as the presence of Khomeini in the political scene is necessary and/or inevitable for the entire bourgeoisie, Islam and Khomeini would be a common basis for the conflicts of the two factions. The unifying role of Khomeini, which every now and then acquires an essential importance, prevents the conflicts of the two factions from escalating so much that the revolutionary movement may largely benefit from it. Khomeini is a symbol that the bourgeoisie has temporarily adopted in order to maintain its unity when the internal conflicts and rivalry heightens. Khomeini is the bourgeoisie's desire for unity which is objectified in a person.

No doubt that this is a shaky unity. The stable unity of the bourgeoisie requires the emergence of the direct representatives of monopoly capital in the practical scene of politics. Indeed, the political force unifying the bourgeoisie cannot be the product of the alliance and mechanical fusion of the two present factions. This political force will unite the bourgeoisie under a single banner, by negating both factions in their present reality, and nonetheless, by replacing the agent of the union of the two present factions — Khomeini. Also, the characteristics of this third force, the synthesis, can-not be simply a "collection" of the characteristics of the present two factions; rather it will appear in advanced and purified forms of these characteristics. One cannot, of course, present a precise picture of the features of this synthesis; it may only he possible to discuss the most probable alter-native of the political leadership of the bourgeoisie with due attention to the preparations being made presently inside and outside the country, the manifest tendencies of the bourgeoisie towards the "Bakhtiarite" alternative and the probable agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and their priorities. But, in view of what we have so far said, we may explain the content and main outlines of the policies of this political synthesis in a more precise manner. The basis of movement of this third force lies in the fact that suppression and deceit should be carried on, but liberalism and theocracy must both be rejected. Hence, while Bani-Sadrism will suffer defeat in its attempt to bring Islam into conformity with liberalism, mainly due to incompatibility of liberalism with the needs of the bourgeoisie, the IRP whose suppressive operation is in conformity with the principal axis of the bourgeoisie's policy at this specific juncture, will lose its instrumental character mainly due to its unavoidable reliance on theocracy, and must be replaced with a political current which will defend the same policy but by non-Islamic justifications. The bourgeoisie and imperialism demand suppression without theocracy and order without liberalism. The realization of this demand of the bourgeoisie is the prime task of its future political leadership.


[4] This refers to an ideal society based on the holy book, Qoran, in which unity, justice and equality for all Moslems are accomplished. —Ed.

[5] Reference is made to a verse in Qoran concerning how the infidels must be dealt with. —Ed.

[6] Literal meaning is "Islamic Jurisprudent's Guardianship"; absolute authority in juridical and political systems exercised by clergy, and at the top of which the highest Ayatollah, representing God. —Ed.

[7] Imam is the title of Khomeini. —Ed.

[8] All prominent liberal figures of different factions and tendencies within the National Front (the original party of the Iranian Liberal bourgeoisie), or without it. —Ed.

[9] Reference is made to the last speech made in the parliament by Bakhtiar, the last premier appointed by the Shah; Qom is a major holy town near Tehran. —Ed.

[10] This refers to the remnants of the Shah's secret police and his party respectively, who Rave been since the Uprising actively serving the IRP. —Ed.

Two Factions
Within the Bourgeois-Imperialist Counter-Revolution

Part III
Extracted from: Besooy-e-Sosyalism No.4 January 1980

In considering the role and functions of Jae two factions of the Iranian ruling body .a maintaining and consolidating the supremacy of the bourgeoisie and of imperialism in the two previous sections, we attempted to underscore this point that the counter revolution first and foremost must he viewed as an forming and still evolving phenomenon. Further, we stated the way in which our revolution and especially the unfinished insurrection of Feb. 1979 deprived the Iranian bourgeoisie of the Shah's regime which acted as its sole political and ideological leadership, and left the restoration of a single leadership within the counter-revolution to the course of development of a long and turbulent period of rivalry among different representatives and political currents of the bourgeoisie. We emphasized that what follows above all from our discussion is that the outcome of this process of rivalry is neither the supremacy of one rival over the others nor the achievement of the ideological and political leadership of the Bourgeoisie by one of the existing rivals. Rather, it will be the arising of a political current in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, released from the ideological and political restrictions of the two existing factions, while embracing and developing the reactionary, counter-revolutionary, anti-proletarian characteristics of both factions. We have called this a "political synthesis" for it could only arise upon the ground of activities and operations of the two existing factions of the ruling body, utilizing the strongholds the bourgeoisie attains through both factions whether in cooperation or separately. This political synthesis, this single leadership of the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution could not be anything but a bourgeois political-ideological current directly representing the interests of monopoly capital. The single leadership of the bourgeoisie in Iran is realizable only under the banner of monopoly capital and the rise of the synthesis which is under discussion would mark the termination of a period of dispersion and crisis induced by the absence of this leadership within the ranks of the bourgeoisie — a dispersion which has been imposed on the bourgeoisie by the economic crisis and the revolution.

In the first two parts, we have referred to different points, each of which should be elaborated upon in specific discussions. But, in so far as these articles are concerned with outlining the proletarian attitude towards the ruling body, and towards the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution as a whole, we need to review the general tenets presented in the previous articles:

    1) On the basis of what we have said we stand counter to the viewpoints that render a mechanical and static picture of the counter-revolution. The world of the counter-revolution does not limit itself to the field of rivalry between the two existing factions of the ruling body. The political destiny of the bourgeoisie could not be merely traced in the situation of the IRP and the liberals. On the contrary, the existing rivalry itself must be looked upon as a period of transformation, from the midst of different links and in the course of development of which, the bourgeoisie explores that ultimate form of political leadership which reflects and fulfils the fundamental needs of capital, organizes the chaotic apparatus of bourgeois rule and helps the Iranian bourgeoisie to quickly consign to oblivion the "nightmare of revolution", returns to "economy", and resume the process of capital accumulation as suits its interest. Thus, a Marxist analysis of the counter-revolutionary camp cannot be confined to examining only the dispute between the IRP and the liberals but it should advance the inquiry and analysis of the fundamental requisites of the Iranian bourgeoisie under the present concrete conditions and on this basis disclose and explain the roots of ruling body's dispute itself with a materialist method.

    2) Also in this respect, the former articles make cur analysis distinct from that of those forces that either basically consider the policy of the Iranian bourgeoisie separate from the interests of the imperialist monopolies and [view it] abstracted from the process of securing the monopoly bourgeoisie's hegemony in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, or regard the liberal bourgeoisie as the representative of monopoly capital and, therefore, view the consolidation of monopoly capital's hegemony and the rising to power of the liberal bourgeoisie as the same process. The whole reasoning in the first two parts of this article, and our entire perception in the course of the post-Uprising period that was published in our first pamphlets and especially in the preface to the pamphlet "Workers' Sit-in in the Ministry of Labour" in March of 1979, has been based on the fact that the present economic crisis and revolution forced the genuine political representatives of monopoly capital (and thereby, the natural and desirable leadership of the Iranian bourgeoisie) to retreat and, temporarily, imposed some other political representatives on the bourgeoisie. Under the present circumstances, the presence of monopoly capital could not and should not necessarily be searched for in the body of active bourgeois parties and currents. Neither the IRP nor the liberals are the genuine representatives of monopoly capital. Rather, they are [the components of] a transient combination to safeguard the bourgeoisie and Iranian capitalism from further encroachment of the revolution; a combination which was imposed upon the monopoly bourgeoisie in the course of a retreat; a combination which precisely because it could stick itself to the revolution in the period of anti-monarchist struggle, thanks to the absence of a vivid proletarian policy, then in the revolutionary and critical conditions [followed), and as long as "the revolution must be suppressed in the name of revolution", is of more efficiency for the bourgeoisie than the genuine currents of the monopoly bourgeoisie. As for the liberals, this point refers to nothing but to their historical and classical role. The liberal bourgeoisie is ever to act hypocritically. But in the case of IRP, we emphasize its instrumental character which enables imperialism to get hold of the bridle of the petty-bourgeoisie and, thanks to the extensive prevalence of conservative religious thinking (a declining feature) in its ranks, drive it to confrontation with the revolutionary proletariat. We regarded this instrumental character as the essence of the IRP and as its raison d'Γͺtre, further, we essentially questioned it as "being a Party" in the classical sense as a current formed in the process of defending the interests of a particular class or stratum, relies upon a particular class, and places before itself a program for the realization of the goals and interests of this class. We regarded the IRP as a mixture of the most suspicious circles on the one hand, and religious petty-bourgeois circles on the other hand, which by active use of Islam and of Khomeini himself, and [due to] the illusion of a broad mass of toiling people towards the latter, was at least in the beginning capable of attracting and making use of the confused masses of poor city-dwellers in achieving its reactionary goals. To say that the IRP is a "party established for the [Iranian] petty-bourgeoisie by imperialism" could be an exaggerating but nevertheless an expressive summary of our viewpoint as regards this reactionary current.

    In this way, we also distinguish ourselves from those comrades who evaluate the IRP as the political organ of the traditional, upper-strata petty-bourgeoisie. In assessing the class character and role of this Party, what must be particularly considered is basically not the composition of its constituent circles and elements, but its prevalent policies. Thus we attempted to elucidate the conformity of this Party's practice and operation with the immediate interests of monopoly capital under the post-Uprising special circumstances. [We pointed out that] attracting and turning the conservative strata of the petty-bourgeoisie into the agent of the imperialist policy is the raison d'Γͺtre of the IRP, and any assessment of the IRP which explains its class character on the basis of the observation of the composition of its elements and members, is bound to adopt a deviationist position against it.

    3) This reality that neither the IRP, an advocate of theocracy, nor the liberals, advocates of the half-way bourgeois democracy, are the genuine representatives of the monopoly bourgeoisie, also implies that the process of the arising of a single leadership in the ranks of the bourgeoisie is necessarily [the process of) the weakening of the foundations of both theocracy and liberalism (for the bourgeoisie). If it is the waves of the revolution that has brought to power the second-class political representatives and parties of the bourgeoisie, and if the "suppression of the revolution under the name of revolution" is the philosophy of their coming to power, then it is evident that the more they drive back the revolution the more they forfeit their desirability as a government for the bourgeoisie. They are, due to their nature, parties and currents acting as middlemen, paving the road for the bourgeoisie's stable and genuine political representatives. They would have thoroughly succeeded in playing their part only at a time when they have gone, entrusting their place to those who have come to resume the movement of capital on the paved and levelled road.

    This is the doomed fate of any middleman. They cannot be one side of a transaction. It must be also mentioned, however, that the appearance of the political representatives of monopoly capital does not necessarily correspond to the physical disappearance of all politicians who have a part in the existing composition of the government. Bakhtiar, Madani, Nazih, and the like, are evident examples of those bourgeois-liberals who have openly joined their real master, the monopoly bourgeoisie. The rejection of liberalism as a political trend does not necessarily mean the dismissal of the bourgeois liberal politicians; as the "popularity" of these politicians, and especially the bourgeoisie's reliance upon them, does not necessarily mean that liberalism has acquired a class base within the bourgeoisie. This is a point which must be taken into account in examining the course of gaining power by the monopoly bourgeoisie in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, and also relatedly, in considering the manner of strengthening of Bani-Sadr's faction during the war. On the other hand, the arising of the monopoly bourgeoisie's single leadership does not necessarily mean the "return" of, and the seizure of power by, the imperialist opposition (composed of the defeated monarchists and the far-sighted bourgeois-liberals) and its known politicians. In the two faction" discussion, by examining the fundamental needs of monopoly capital and thereby of the bourgeoisie as a whole (that is, the counter-revolutionary order and the productive order); we have attempted to derive those essential features of this single leadership independent of its present slogans, politicians and rudimentary forms. The current representing the monopoly bourgeoisie will be that current which provide an answer for those fundamental problems [already discussed], from the viewpoint of the interests, and on the basis of the needs and programs, of monopoly capital; no matter which of the today's active politicians and currents are to undertake an active role in the composition of this political current.

We stated that the monopoly bourgeoisie's policy as regards our revolution is, at the most basic level, aimed at realizing the two principal preconditions for the resumption of a new cycle of capital accumulation:

Firstly, the bourgeoisie wants the wheels of revolution to cease, the democratic gains of the Uprising to be taken back, and the complete submission of the working class, and other exploited toilers thereby, to the sway of capital to be once again secured; thus the establishment of the counter-revolutionary order in the society. Secondly, enjoying the repression revived and on the basis of pauperism brought about by the economic crises, a productive order appropriate to the resumption of a new cycle of capital accumulation in Iran, as a country dominated by imperialism and a sphere of production of imperialist super-profits, must be established.

In considering the two factions we reached the conclusion that the present ruling body and its constituent composition did not possess that collection of features which would otherwise enable it to represent and lead the endeavour of the bourgeoisie to realize these two preconditions. The IRP which has taken the initiative in suppressing the revolution under the name of revolution, due to its nature and role, is ideologically and economically not able to answer the long term needs of the Iranian bourgeoisie. The liberals, on the other hand, who have undertaken to sanctify the private ownership and capital and renovate the chaotic state machine, suffers three-fold: in the economic sphere they are not able to go beyond the intelligence and ideals of intermediate capital in the domestic market; in politics they do not quite understand the significance of informal methods of organizing the camp of the counter-revolution; and finally in the ideological sphere, by advocating their liberal utopianism, they add fuel to the existing dispersion in the ranks of the bourgeoisie. However, the two factions in combination, with one another have acted as an effective instrument serving the imperialist policy in the post-Uprising circumstances. For they firstly, safeguard the bourgeoisie and capitalism against the revolutionary offensive by the masses and, secondly, develop the necessary objective and subjective grounds for the direct political representatives of the monopoly bourgeoisie to come to the scene. These grounds generally take shape as a result of the concurrent activities of the two factions and as developments upon which both agree, or as a result of consequence of their conflicts. In other words, whether the two factions are in agreement on enforcing certain policies, or they come into conflict over [certain] issues, as a consequence of their operation, the monopoly bourgeoisie attains to general and fundamental achievements. These counter-revolutionary developments, these objective and subjective grounds for a political synthesis within the bourgeoisie resulting in the restoration of monopoly capital's hegemony in the political forces of the class, could be generally outlined as follows:

1) The sanctification and legitimization of the capitalist ownership and exploitation.

The Iranian revolution, despite the strong ideological dominance of the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie, was undoubtedly from the outset holding a protesting clamour against the bourgeois ownership and capitalist exploitation; a clamour which was in fact a reflection of the realities of the existing economic relations and the participation of the proletariat in the overthrow of the Shah's regime as the principal motivating force. Although as a consequence of the ideological, political, and organizational backwardness of the proletariat and the absence of a steadfast communist party, this ambiguous socialist tendency did not manifest itself but in the limited and vulgar context of petty-bourgeois "socialism" and equalitarianism, the workers and toilers — at least is their consciousness — in the frame of ideals and ambiguous slogans such as "righteousness", "equality", "Touhidi and Qest society"[11], "non-eternity of capital', and the like, depicted a bloody prospect for the destiny of capital and the "capitalist". (It will be quite instructive if we at a proper time take a look at the attitude of the petty-bourgeois leaders of the anti-monarchist movement on the one hand, and that of the communists on the ether hand, towards this ambiguous "socialist" tendency. While the likes of "Father Taleghani"[12] by the aid of impassioned Mojahedin youth, promising "Islamic Qest and Touhid", and, in essence, by promising a "kind" of socialism, rallied the workers under the banner of Khomeini, a great section of the communist movement actively hindered the proletariat from any "encroachment" upon "capital and the national bourgeoisie" both in words and deed! The bourgeoisie not only understood its own interests but also the historical tendencies of the proletariat; hence it brought forth quasi-socialist promises to attract the workers. In contrast, the majority of the communist movement not only was ignorant of the interests of the proletariat, but also, of the aims and methods of the bourgeoisie, and attempted to cover the grotesque nature of the whole of bourgeoisie. This is an historical tragedy much as it is a warning for those who take pride in their theoretical carelessness.)

In any case, the objective and subjective grounds for the realization of this "ambiguous" socialist ideal did not exist; the present regime undertook its historical mission to protect capital and, at the same time, prove to the proletariat the bankruptcy of petty-bourgeois socialism. The first condition for the bourgeoisie to regain its coherence and get rid of the "abyss" of the revolution was to break up this amorphous ideological advancing of the proletariat. The bourgeois property had to be protected from a proletariat eager to confiscate, expropriate and control. Those capitalists, who, in the first months after the Uprising, saw not only their property but also their lives in jeopardy and ran away, had to return to their business; the proletariat had to go back to factories and dismiss all thought of offending the holy domain of capital; the situation had to go back to "normal". On these matters, both factions completely accorded and acted in mutual and organic affinity. One faction (the liberals) sought to exonerate the whole of bourgeois property, whilst the other (Khomeini and Co.) tried to fob it off on the masses in the religious guise of "Islamic legitimate and conditional property". The former demanded the acquittal and return of all "criminals of production', while the latter by offering a few "Mofsed-e-Fel-Arz"[13] as sacrifices before the "Ommatt"[14], paved the way for the rest.

It did not take long for those who knew the meaning of "communism's heavy strike" to declare legitimacy of bourgeois property and capitalist exploitation; It took even lees to admit this for the proletariat and the rural and urban poor who were deprived of communist thinking and leadership. The nationalization of the industries gave also the appropriate "organizational" form to minimize friction and confrontation; "there could be no other form of property more legitimate than that of a state appointed by God and the prophet and relied upon the Islamic nation". The bourgeoisie rapidly protected the economic bases of its society from the direct offence of the proletariat, thanks to the Islamic Republic regime and its see-saw type relations, and to its sham quarrels concerning the question of property. Today, the ambiguous ideal of "Qest and classless society" has been transformed to the real demand of "workers control over production and distribution": this is a "retreat" from the ambiguous petty-bourgeois socialism and a practical step forward towards the ideological and political independence of the proletariat. Yet it must be acknowledged that the Islamic republic has seriously pressed forward its most primary tasks, and has achieved many successes in maintaining and securing the bourgeoisie's sway and in creating the necessary grounds for the coherence of the ranks of the bourgeoisie under the leadership of monopoly bourgeoisie.

2) The elimination of the democratic gains of the Uprising and the submission of the masses to the complete denial of their political rights.

The Islamic Republic regime, whose leaders came to the scene essentially to prevent the coercive insurrection of the masses, since its very establishment has tenaciously attempted to repel the proletariat and the revolutionary toilers, step by step, and bulwark by bulwark, from the democratic gains of the Uprising. In the last part we noted how the establishment of the counter-revolutionary order is the fundamental precondition for the resumption of the "normal" process of production and capital accumulation in the country. Also, in different writings we have emphasized how, on the other hand, the fundamental democratic changes in the political relations, is the core issue of the present revolution from the point of view of the revolutionary proletariat. Thus, the counter-revolutionary character of the government and the factions within it, and their effective role in providing the grounds for the bourgeoisie to consolidate its sway under the leadership of the monopoly bourgeoisie, must be in the first place Searched for in their anti-democratic practice. In this regard, the two functions within the government have had two different but certainly complementary practices.

While from the very beginning, the liberals rushed in a flurry to examine and renovate the damaged and crumbling state apparatus, Khomeini, the IRP and Co. endeavoured to fill in the vacuum of the repressive apparatus by declaration of decrees, harassment, stupefication and intimidation. Strikes, sit-ins, and "opposition to the government" were announced to be against religion and hence illegal and doomed to God's retribution. The process of replacing the armed people by the organized gangs of the pro-government ultra-rightist petty-bourgeoisie started. Immediately following the Uprising the decree of general disarmament was issued. Wherever the masses were directly engaged in establishing the organs of exercising their will directly and from below, they were confronted with resistance and later with strong offensive by the government. The proletariat and the revolutionary toilers had made their crucial choice on the basis of their illusions. By accepting the hegemony of the petty-bourgeoisie's policy and thinking, they essentially left the political power in the hands of the bourgeoisie. And now, this latter, had no objectives except depriving the masses of any democratic election pushing them outside the arena of political activity, keeping them away from any possibility of exercising their will and, finally, turning them into a means for restoring the [bourgeois] sway — what the masses themselves had once overthrown.

The Islamic Republic not only shrank back from recognizing any kind of democratic changes, but by relying on religious stupefication and harassment of the masses, derided their democratic ideals as "imperialistic" and "western". The equality of men and women was called prostitution, [the demand for] welfare was denounced as "animalistic", and the freedom of speech and assembly were called the freedom of "conspiracy and corruption". The Shah's illegal authorities were legally vested in the "Vali-e-Amre"[15]. Torture was legalized under the rubric of "Ordained Penance". The women and the religious minorities were officially turned into second class citizens, and so on and so forth. This medieval attack on the democratic demands of the masses has numerous aspects.

On paper, the bourgeoisie not only did not retreat, but generally, and to a great extent, came out as if the revolution and the revolutionaries owed something. But beyond paper, in reality, the revolutionary workers and toilers kept many democratic strongholds at the expense of great sacrifices, and today, with the escalating mass struggle, they have before themselves the perspective of the seizure of new strongholds. All in all, this process, i.e. the process of the onslaught of the regime and its factions on the democratic gains of the revolution, is the essential underlying background for the political coherence of the bourgeoisie and the return of the monopoly bourgeoisie to the forefront of the ranks of the counter-revolution against the revolutionary proletariat.

The savage attack on the revolutionary Kurdistan, infliction of the anti-democratic and anti-worker constitution upon the masses, the assault on the universities and extermination of the communist and :evolutionary students, denial of freedom of speech, assembly, parties, strike, etc, in practice, formation of the medieval courts for the trial of the communists, revolutionary democrats and militant toilers, imposition of an ordered parliament full of enemies of the working class and democracy upon the masses, and hundreds of other sycophantic services to imperialism, are all practical measures that the present regime, with the aid of both ultra-right and liberal factions of itself, has undertaken to help the restoration of the monopoly bourgeoisie's rule.

If the monopoly bourgeoisie of Iran succeeds in crushing the ranks of the revolutionary proletariat and in suppressing the revolutionary-democratic movement, it will undoubtedly go beyond all these forms and measures in organizing the political and economic sway of imperialism. Neither the official and non-official thugs' and club holders' disregard towards the law nor the law of the Islamic parliament, nor the despotism of "Velayat-e-Faghih" and reactionary theocracy, nor the liberal's hypocritical coquetries, would constitute the stable instruments of its class domination. It is to revive the Aryamehrian paradise of capital in those aspects and forms which corresponds the capitalism of Iran as a country dominated by imperialism. However, what it will owe to all existing temporary lackeys of imperialism, i.e. both the liberals and the IRP, is a complete lack of rights which they have endeavoured to impose upon the workers and toilers of Iran.

3) The renovation of a stable state repressive apparatus, sanctification and restoration of the army, political police, and the state bureaucratic apparatus.

These are the fundamental exigencies of the Iranian bourgeoisie, led by the monopoly bourgeoisie, for the onset of a new cycle of capital accumulation on the basis of imperialist exploitation of the proletariat. Roth factions of the government accord on the urgency of this. The dispute and disagreement arises on, firstly, the extent to which these instruments can be relied upon at the present time in suppressing the revolution. In the last part, we considered this point and explained the realism and the utopianism of the IRP and the liberals respectively. And secondly, the extent to which the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution relies upon these [formal and] stable institutions of suppression, as compared to the informal ones, will be under the present conditions directly reflected in the balance of forces between the two governmental factions. This, in turn, impedes an all out consensus within the Islamic Republic on the rapidity with which the process of sanctification and restoration of the formal and centralized, but now chaotic, instruments of suppression should take place.

But in any case, the balance sheet of both factions in providing the grounds for the undisputable sway of the monopoly bourgeoisie is quite brilliant. [In this respect], the communist movement has been aware of, and has emphasized, this reactionary character of the Islamic Republic from the outset. Apart from those social-chauvinists, who have been since the outbreak of the war busy admonishing the Islamic Republic en raising the efficacy of the Islamic Republic army — as if they were experts on logistical affairs, ordnance, and military tactics and strategy, trying to save the "independence" of the government from the foreign advisers — the revolutionary Marxist forces have for long used as subject of exposition and agitation all shameful measures of the Islamic Republic in sanctifying and restoring the pro-US army, reorganizing SAVAK under a new name, and reinstating the most corrupted bureaucratic and anti-democratic forms in the state-apparatus. It is therefore assumed that the significance of this matter as a fundamental background for the coherence of the bourgeoisie and for the consolidation of the hegemony of monopoly capital within the ranks of the counter-revolution needs no further elaboration and emphasis.

4) Forcing the masses to submission to the reduced living standards and to the pauperizing consequences of the economic crisis.

In the pamphlet "The Prospect of Destitution and the Re-Escalation of Revolution" we have already scrutinized the place and importance of this point. There we pointed out that the imposition of the consequences of the economic crisis upon the proletariat and the toiling masses and thereby reducing the value of labour power in society, was itself one of the channels and prerequisites for the capitalist system to escape the economic crisis. We further emphasized that the Iranian bourgeoisie could not resume the accumulation of capital in its desirable way without compelling the masses to submit to the pauperizing results of the economic crisis. This is, however, the economic aspect of the question which has been sufficiently discussed in our previous texts.

From the political point of view, on the other hand, the deepening crisis of capitalism and the intensification of poverty and destitution of the masses, given the absence of a vivid proletarian alternative in the face of the crisis, and the lack of organized mess struggle to defend and raise the living standards of the workers and toiling masses (which must be of serious concern to communists), add fuel to the conservative tendencies within the workers' movement, particularly in the backward segments of the proletariat. The defence of the living standards of the proletariat is the necessary condition for every consistent struggle against the bourgeoisie. If the working masses that are entangled by the plague of unemployment, exposed permanently to lay-off, have their real wages reduced and their economic existence endangered, can not find a solution to all these [sufferings], they would be inevitably affected with strong rightist tendencies.

In such circumstances, it is "order" rather than "revolution" which acquires attraction for the workers. Furthermore, the intensification of poverty and economic insecurity of the toiling masses provides the objective grounds for an increase in the competition among their ranks; and the Islamic Republic, as the bourgeois reaction materialized, would not hesitate to cause utmost division and dispersion in the ranks of the proletariat and the toiling masses. Religious fanaticism, sex, ethnic background, work experience, employed and unemployed statuses, etc., have all become pretexts serving the Islamic republic to break the ranks of the workers movement apart. Reinforcing the conservative tendencies among the masses is the axis of the entire bourgeoisie's propaganda with respect to the economic crisis. This is that single thesis which links Bani-Sadr's and his associates' motto "forget about the councils, you must work my friend" and that of the IRP, Khomeini and Co. "the leftists set fire to the harvest and cause disorder in production".

The government, aided by both factions, has not for a moment been heedless of turning the crisis into the grounds for the consolidation of the political and economic sway of capital. Khomeini and Co., by hoisting the banner of "the soul not the body", and the bourgeois-liberals by advocating the reactionary claim that the revolution itself has been the cause of the economic crisis and of the destitution of the masses, mounted a raid on the living standards of the millions of the workers and toilers. The masses' resistance, led by the industrial proletariat, against this assault, makes the background of a fresh political arising of the masses at the present juncture. This struggle still continues; but to date the reactionary ruling body has vividly made clear its role in laying the groundwork for imperialism and the monopoly bourgeoisie.

5) The sanctification of imperialism and justification of the diplomatic, economic and military relations of the ruling bourgeoisie of Iran with the imperialist countries.

One of the manifest aspects of our revolution has been its open anti-imperialist character. Imperialism in general and U.S imperialism, as the dominant imperialism on the politics and economy of Iran, in particular, has been a target of the Iranian revolutionary proletariat's protest. The boycott of oil to South Africa and Israel by the militant workers of the oil industry in the months prior to the Uprising, is [itself] expressive of the awareness of the Iranian revolutionary proletariat of global roots and foundations of exploitation and repression in Iran. Although the Iranian proletariat has to this very date been unable to fully understand the inevitable and fundamental link between imperialism and dictatorship, and hence the essential tie between the anti-imperialist struggle and the struggle for democracy, the anti-imperialist and particularly the anti-U.S. orientation of the Iranian workers and toilers have made, and is making, the restoration of the pre-revolutionary situation quite difficult for the wounded bourgeoisie of Iran. Needless to say, as a result of the domination of the petty-bourgeois mentality over the mass movement, this orientation did not manifest itself except in the legal, administrative and diplomatic spheres. The present government and both counter-revolutionary factions within it have attempted to make this anti-imperialist tendency of the workers and toiling masses void of any kind of practical economic-class content.

The IRP and Ayatollah Khomeini have reduced imperialism from a distinct, tangible and understandable reality for the toiling masses, down to a supernatural and legendary creature — a genie or a satanic creature as if has come to existence as an anti-thesis to Islam. The revolutionary workers and toilers right from before the Uprising took under attack the symbols of economic power of monopoly capital, i.e. the banks and the industrial and commercial corporations belonging to the monopoly bourgeoisie, as well as the symbol of imperialism's political domination that is the military-police regime of the monarchy. The IRP and Ayatollah Khomeini reduced the anti-imperialist struggles to the chants of Allah-o-Akbar[16] from over the roofs, demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy, and parroting the IRP's void and vulgar slogans. The ordered and void "anti-hostage" braggadocio and "opposition" to Ramsey Clark and other agents of U.S. imperialism's diplomacy, became more and more "expressive" and recurrent with every step monopoly capital took to restore, in practice, its lost economic and political strongholds, and with the increase in exploitation and repression.

"America is the Great Satan and man has never fought the Satan but by resorting to incantation, and to magicians, geomancers and mullahs." This has been the imperialist essence of the so-called anti-imperialist struggle of the IRP, Khomeini and Co. On the other hand, the liberals whose link with imperialism was becoming increasingly evident in the eyes of the masses, made out of this vulgar petty-bourgeois critique of imperialism a pretext and a means to inflict upon the masses their fully-fledged dependence on imperialism and their commitment to renovate the imperialist monopolies' paradise of security and the capitalist exploitation in the dominated country under various pretences — the need for releasing from political isolation", "economic objectivity" and so forth. By the end of two years [since the Uprising], they have taken various steps in this direction; they have divided the imperialist powers into "bad" and "good", openly announced their fundamental union with imperialism in the struggle against "international communism", baptized U.S. imperialism and promised her salvation should she beg forgiveness. They have by all means attempted nor let it become America's turn after the Shah[17], this being from the viewpoint of the monopoly bourgeoisie a giant stride "forward".

6) The incessant suppression of the communist movement and the attraction of petty-bourgeois democracy under the banner of liberalism.

In the optimist mind of many revolutionary workers and communist militants, the February Uprising was the dawn of the establishment of a "national and progressive" state led by the liberal bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie; a state which was supposedly about to guarantee such political freedoms that would render the proletariat and its political forces the opportunity to clearly define their aims, organize themselves and fortify the bulwark of the struggle for socialism on the grounds of free and widespread work of agitation, propaganda and organization. As we had forewarned from the outset, these illusions crushed the wall of reality. The primary aim and task of the new rulers was to impede the scope of the insurrection from expansion, and to attempt to take back its democratic gains. In this respect, it was of utmost necessity to capital and imperialism to suppress the communist movement — a movement whose growth and rise is the sole indicator of the march towards socialism, and which, though falling and rising, was fighting ceaselessly and enthusiastically to expand the democratic gains of the revolution. Obstructing the expansion of open and widespread activity of the communist movement is tantamount to hindering the expansion of the scope of revolution. In this respect, the present regime has played its part quite consistently in serving capital and imperialism and giving the opportunity to the monopoly bourgeoisie for political and military reinforcements. This is one of the holy agreements between the two factions of the government.

Also in this connection, the petty-bourgeois democrats who, fearful of pressures by the regime, dread to get practically and openly close to the communist movement, are due to their wavering nature bound to be gradually drawn under the banner of bourgeois-liberalism and become neutralized. The incessant suppression of the communist movement and neutralization of petty-bourgeois democratism are nothing but an attempt to bring forth among the masses the subjective preconditions of pacifism; a pacifism upon which the bourgeoisie has set hopes so as to deprive the toiling masses of their capability to react in a revolutionary manner against the final assault of the bourgeois imperialist counter-revolution under the leadership of the monopoly bourgeoisie.

The gradual formation and realization of these counter-revolutionary developments are the political meaning of that process through which the monopoly bourgeoisie gets indirectly closer to the consolidation of power. Hence it is clear that when we refer to a synthesis within the bourgeoisie, we do act speak of a suddenly generated action-reaction or of a historical-political juggling. The principal objective and subjective grounds upon which the bourgeoisie unite and rally [its ranks] under the banner of the genuine and stable political forces of the monopoly bourgeoisie, are those very fundamental developments that are taking shape today, and since before the Uprising, thanks to the efforts of Khomeini, the IRP, the liberals and all their assorted lackeys. The operation of the Islamic Republic regime and the mutual relations between its two factions, are the catalyst for bringing forth the conditions in which the monopoly bourgeoisie is able to strike its final blow to the revolution; such conditions that, once materialized, will avow the Islamic Republic and its factions to be completely ended and unnecessary from the viewpoint of imperialism and the bourgeoisie.

If the above grounds are realized; if these counter-revolutionary developments are brought forth; if, in the absence of a vivid proletarian alternative, and under the bombardment of liberal propaganda and a burden of destitution, the masses fall into the abyss of pacifism; if the "nationalized" and "Islamised" army of the Shah is organized and ready for action; if the new SAVAK is prepared to extensively hunt down the revolutionaries; if the economic, social and cultural lives of the masses are entangled in the meshes of the vast bureaucracy of the bourgeoisie; and...; then the scene will be ready for the last act of the play by the counter-revolution — the establishment of the monopoly bourgeoisie's dictatorship. This is a dictatorship which will be neither liberal nor will it be fond of the clergy and the theocracy; a dictatorship which will promise employment, housing, water and electricity, and prevention and cure of the basic diseases; a dictatorship which will swear to [restore] "Iran's glory", "modernism" and "order"; a dictatorship which will condemn "anarchy" and stand for organized and centralized suppression; and in short, a dictatorship which will be the soul of the Aryamehrian reaction reincarnated in the body of a republic — a non-Islamic one of course.

It is the future of the bourgeoisie and the counter-revolution which is today taking shape in the womb of present counter-revolutionary development. And the revolutionary proletariat who is to stand against both the present and the future of the bourgeoisie, must, of necessity, go beyond the two factions' dispute which will bring about the weakening of the present government, recognize the growth of the grounds for the future government and hinder it; [it must] fight the present government, without falling to the support of the future government. The tactical policy of the proletariat must, rely on such bases that enable it to fight both the present and the future of the bourgeoisie; weakening and driving back its present government without rendering favourable grounds for the arising of its future government.

Hence the discussion is no more limited to the confrontation by the proletariat the two factions within the present ruling body; rather, it is the proletariat confronting the process of formation of the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution. The discussion is over the proletariat's attitude towards the dialectical process of evolution of the camp of the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution; a process which itself develops towards negating the existing conditions of the camp of the counter-revolution and providing more favourable circumstances and forms for the bourgeoisie. If, therefore, the revolutionary proletariat wants — which indeed it does — to negate the present circumstances of the counter-revolution, in its own particular way and in the service of its own revolutionary aims, it must first and foremost settle accounts with this process of evolution, taking a clear stand against both the upholding and the bourgeois rejection of the present government. The necessity of the independent rank of the proletariat and the independent proletarian alternative has never brought to the fore and proved its vital significance so vividly. This is all we have learned from the analysis and discussion of the two factions", and have clearly reflected in our platforms concerning the coup d'ιtat and the war.

We view the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution as an evolving and forming phenomenon, and, therefore, consider the counter-revolution in a dynamic political and social framework. In examining the forces of the counter-revolution, we have in mind the analysis of a collection of objective and subjective conditions which on the one hand are suggestive of a change in the balance of forces of the counter-revolution against the revolution, and, on the other, provide the grounds for the ultimate formation of the political leadership of the bourgeoisie. The course of evolution of the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution, is the course of forfeiting the gains of the Uprising, is the course of retreating by the masses from their revolutionary demands, (and) is the course of the approaching of the bourgeoisie co the establishment of the two kind of reactionary fundamental orders the counter-revolutionary political order, and the capitalist production order. Seeing the counter-revolution merely in the counter-revolutionary parties, forces and individuals, and taking a stand against these phenomena, would not be sufficient, for, such a narrow-sightedness prevents the communist movement from understanding the certain political and economic developments which are indicative of the overall advance of the bourgeoisie, and upon which depends the evolution of the counter-revolution and the achievement by the bourgeoisie of the ultimate form of its political leadership.

Could we positively define the revolution and its development, and if we have a clear picture of what the proletariat regards as the advance and victory of the revolution, then we would have a very precise criterion to appraise all factions of the counter revolution — whether the former, the defeated, the present or the future, the liberal or the clerical, and so on and so forth — and their part in pursuing the imperialist policy. For we would have [then] recognized the bourgeoisie in its confrontation with the proletariat and in its attack on the defined and distinct strongholds of revolution. We would [then] not for a moment bold back from adopting an explicit and clear proletarian position in defence of the revolution and expansion of its scope, for we would no more be bewildered by the appearance of new forms of political leadership in the bourgeoisie and of new methods of demagogy and unexpected "anti-imperialist or freedom loving" pretences such as the hue and cry of the "hostage taking" of the one faction or the lament for "freedom" of the other, the 'political independence" of the one or the "defence of the motherland" of the other, and would never change our tactics in accordance with the seasons (we will come back to this).

Our platforms in regard to the coup and the war reflect clearly this central thesis and essential insight of the "two faction" analysis. We view the camp of the counterrevolution not just as parties and forces already formed, but as an evolving and forming phenomenon. Hence in our platform on the coup we warned both against the coup and against the counter-coup, and call upon the proletariat to resolutely confront the coup relying on a counter-coup revolutionary rank, and at the same time, avoid supporting the present government. Whether it leads to the victory of another faction of the bourgeoisie, or is suppressed by the bourgeoisie's existing forces, the coup d'ιtat is expressive of a development in the counter-revolutionary camp and of a threat to definite bulwarks of the revolution — the democratic gains of the Uprising. Otherwise, to arbitrarily and metaphysically "overestimate" or "underestimate" the "defeated counter-revolution" or the Islamic Republic, does not add anything to the tactical knowledge of the proletariat. Likewise, in our platform on the war, we emphasized that the Iran-Iraq war facilitates [certain] developments serving the suppression of the Iranian revolution and the extension of the monopoly bourgeoisie's hegemony in Iran and in the region, and, therefore, we stood for the revolutionary proletariat to rise to defend its revolution against the capitalists war and its political and economic consequences. A comparison of our stand against the war with the two principal positions taken by the Marxist-Leninist movement, i.e. anarcho-pacifism and social-chauvinism, may reveal the significance of our attitude towards the course of formation of the camp of bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution.

The anarcho-pacifists reduce the bourgeois counter-revolution to the existing ruling body and its two factions, and in an attempt to adopt an "independent" position, at most succeed in taking a stand against these two factions. They do not see in the womb of the existing situation those grounds upon which the bourgeoisie develops its desirable leadership and coheres its ranks. So, with the outbreak of war, they place the overthrow (negation) of the present government of the bourgeoisie on the immediate agenda of the revolutionary proletariat. They do not see this reality that the proletariat is not alone in demanding the overthrow of the bourgeoisie's present government, and that the monopoly bourgeoisie, too, in the last analysis stands for the negation of the present government and its development into new forms. Hence, they are not able to understand and dissociate the two different collections of subjective and objective conditions which prepare the grounds for the revolutionary or the counter-revolutionary overthrow of the government.

Anarchism sees all the evil amassed in the government and demands its overthrow; and once the war brings forth this possibility, they promptly blow the bugle "overthrow the government" (i.e. civil war as a tactic). The anarchists do not grasp that from what angle and by bringing about what collection of definite subjective and objective conditions, does the war destabilize the foundations of the present government of the bourgeoisie. Is it the proletariat or the bourgeoisie which, due to the war and the changes arising thereby, approaches closer to political power? And what is to be done so as to enable the proletariat to make advances in the class struggle and the revolution during the war? These questions are not even raised among the anarchists. They do not understand that if the overthrow of the present government does not lead to the establishment of the proletariat's revolutionary-democratic alternative, it will end up with [further] unison of the counter-revolution under the leadership of the monopoly bourgeoisie. Hence they place insurrection (civil war, etc.) on the agenda of the masses in general , regardless of the measure of the revolutionary proletariat's readiness, regardless of the necessity of providing an independent proletarian alternative, regardless of the proletariat's program in the present revolution, and irrespective of — what is the essential condition for a victorious insurrection under the leadership of the proletariat — the necessity of organisational readiness of the proletariat (the question of party). Even the [mere; conception that an amorphous mass insurrection, in the absence of proletarian leadership and alternative, may turn to a much effective means in the hands of the monopoly bourgeoisie for reinforcing its leadership in the ranks of the bourgeoisie and establishing a government desirable for imperialism, does not come to the minds of the anarcho-pacifists. They neither know the socio-economic and political changes desirable for the proletariat (necessary for the expansion of the revolution), nor do they think about the changes desirable for the bourgeoisie (the preconditions of the suppression of the revolution). For them, the counter-revolution reduces to the political currents and the governmental "apparatus" of the bourgeoisie; the violent smashing of this "apparatus" is always and everywhere both the strategy and the tactics of anarchism.

The "two faction" analysis specifically singles out the concept of "approaching the power by the proletariat from the side" under the present circumstances. This firstly requires the defence and extension of those definite economic and political gains which gives the proletariat freedom of action and ample opportunity to gather and mobilize its forces and prepare the grounds for an organized and victorious insurrection; and secondly, as a corollary, it prevents the bourgeoisie from taking back these gains, and hinders the monopoly bourgeoisie from advancing and consolidating its hegemony in the camp of the counter-revolution and, in the final analysis, the government. "Defence of the revolution against the capitalists' war", this is that concrete slogan which reflects these two aspects of the proletariat's position.

On the other hand, the social-chauvinists (and particularly Razmandegan before its self-criticism), ignore, in a different manner, the dialectical process of evolution in the camp of the counter-revolution. The organization of Razmandegan takes into account a new pole (no doubt a real one) in the political rivalries within the bourgeoisie: the "defeated counter-revolution", and attempts to have in sight the probable changes, in the governmental form of the counter-revolution. This is considered as the probable seizure of power by the defeated counter-revolution which organizes itself beyond the Iranian borders. But, what causes Razmandegan to fall into the abyss of opportunism is its mechanistic approach to the camp of the counter-revolution — what Razmandegan itself formulates as the "accentuation of the danger of the defeated counter-revolution".

Razmandegan, in an attempt to go beyond the existing situation of the government and look beyond the rivalries between "the existing factions", is at most able to add another existing and ready rival to the field. Razmandegan, (therefore,) turns the "two-pole rivalry" into a triangle: two factions inside the country, within the government, and the third, "the defeated counter-revolution", outside; and the future of the bourgeoisie may be the coming to power of this third pole. Here, the process through which the bourgeoisie develops and the economic and political grounds which count for the rise of a political synthesis are not kept in view, rather it is (merely) the possibility of substitution of political forces with one another which is considered. This is a metaphysical and mechanistic approach to the camp of the counter-revolution which examines its future only in a framework of reciprocal encounters, rivalry and challenge of power by different elements, circles and the actual and existing forces of the bourgeoisie. Such a point of departure could not escape falling into social-chauvinism, once the Iran-Iraq war broke out. If the war intensifies the possibility for the defeated counter-revolution (which invades from outside the borders) to grab at (or, at least, come closer to) political power, and if this third force should enter the country by jets, tanks and cannons to assist the bourgeoisie, then taking a "stand against" it and "impeding" its arrival and establishment can place no task on the agenda of the proletariat but to array geographically and militarily against this third force. This is a physical confrontation by the proletariat in respond to a physical substitution in the camp of the bourgeoisie. No doubt that Razmandegan starts from a socialist good intention, but metaphysical analysis, i.e. relying upon bourgeois methodology in analysis, turns it into a defencist. Hence, the Razmandegan's independent rank in the warβ€”front has no meaning other than its geographical and military independence from other defenders of the borders; Razmandegan thus turns into an independent battalion of the Islamic Republic's army.

But in "the two faction" discussion, we speak of a political synthesis in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, in the precise sense of the word synthesis. The war may facilitate and accelerate a synthesis and a process. This process, however, takes place as definite economic, political and ideological developments, and as changes in the position and balance of forces of the classes. The discussion is not on the extent to which this or that bourgeois party is reactionary, nor is it on how principal the danger of this or that bourgeois faction may be. Rather, the discussion is concerned with those reactionary developments for the realization of which all bourgeois forces have an active part, and in doing so, at any certain juncture one of them takes the lead in the forefront of the whole class. The developments that unless the proletariat consciously and decisively holds out against them and reverse their course, will lead to creeping to power by the monopoly bourgeoisie. And then, those who today take their position on the basis of their knowledge of the present politicians and political factions of the bourgeoisie, will undoubtedly be stunned by the flexibility when the current parties and politicians of the bourgeoisie change their position and their capability to call forth brand-new parties and politicians who have at the present no place in the "triangles" and "squares" of rivalry.

For the revolutionary proletariat to maintain and extend the gains of the revolution, and mobilize its forces for a victorious insurrection, under the Iran-Iraq war circumstances or any other conditions, it must be able to withstand the growth of the counter-revolution as a whole. To do this, the proletariat, before attempting to analyze the forces of the counter-revolution, should realize, and take stand against, the counter-revolutionary situation; this, of course, being impossible except by a precise definition of revolution and the proletariat's independent objectives in it. That is why, in regard to the question of war we called upon the proletariat to build up a political array against the war and not a military array against the Iraqi troops. while, and in so far as, the struggle for mobilizing the forces of the class and providing the proletariat's revolutionary alternative and on this basis launching a victorious insurrection, has not yet been resolved, The existing strongholds must be maintained and expanded, and, at the same time, those developments which bring forth the grounds for the establishment of the direct dictatorship of the monopoly bourgeoisie must be prevented: This prevention has no meaning other than defending the gains of the revolution against the means that the war make available to the bourgeoisie to take them back, and expanding these gains on the basis of the circumstances that the war may bring about in the advantage of the proletariat.

Finally, we come to the question that what practical conclusions this discussion arrives at, as regards the camp of the counter-evolution in general, and the Islamic Republic in specific.

Our discussion in the first place, brings to light "what is not to be done" with respect to the government and its two constituent factions. Regarding the domestic conflicts within the government, the revolutionary proletariat should under no circumstances take side with one or the other ruling bourgeois-imperialist currents. Classifying the counter-revolution and dividing it into "good", "bad", "worse", "reactionary" and "more reactionary"(!) is for those who have no conception whatsoever of Marxism, and by "politics" and political struggle, understand "playing tricks" and conspiracy. The communists should undertake to explain to the broad masses of workers and toilers the different part each of the two factions play in pursuing the bourgeoisie's counter-revolutionary policy, and, in particular, the part that their conflicts play in safeguarding, prolonging and improving the sway of capital and imperialism in Iran. Meanwhile, these very same internal conflicts and disputes provide the best grounds for exposing the anti-worker and counter-revolutionary nature and objectives of the IRP, the liberals and Khomeini who has practically secured the coherence within the government despite his open tendency to back up the IRP.

But, as we indicated, it is not enough to merely take a stand against both factions of the government if we are to arrive at a position against the entire bourgeoisie. The, communist movement must also undertake to expose and reject before the masses of workers and toilers the bourgeois critique of the government which mainly rely upon rejecting theocracy on the one hand, and criticizing the impotence of the liberals to restore order on the other hand. The exposition of the imperialist opposition, consisted of the defeated counter-revolution and the former liberals, is the only specific case of the exposition which we have in mind here. On the one hand the operation of the present government adds fuel to the hatred of the masses for "clericalism" and their tendency to demand a secular government, and on the other hand, the burden of economic crisis on the shoulders of the masses along with the absence of a revolutionary alternative and dissemination of liberal critique of the IRP and the Velayat-e-Faghih, drive the masses to give their consent to the capitalist legality and productive order, conditions in which "at least living conditions are improved, unemployment decreases, and politics and economy are under control". Taking the hands of the Mullahs off the government and economy, restoring the bourgeois law and order, and reorganizing the chaotic economy; this is the platform of the monopoly bourgeoisie. This is what the monopoly bourgeoisie calls upon in order to restore the pre-revolution conditions and secure the total submission of the revolution to the counter-revolution.

And if there are many toilers who have the patience to listen to the monopoly bourgeoisie owes it to the Islamic Republic and its policy of "suppressing the revolution under the name of revolution". Thus the communists, along with setting forth a proletarian critique of the present government, must alertly expose this "critical" platform of the monopoly bourgeoisie and those political currents which at any juncture advocate it. The communists stand for the complete separation of religion from the state. The communists demand the improvement of the living conditions of the toiling masses. These are, of course, a part, and only a part, of our minimum demands, but, this should not prevent us from recognizing and exposing the hateful face of the monopoly bourgeoisie which is striving to turn these rightful demands of the masses into a means to acquit its wounded dictatorship and its disgraced political representatives, and represents its regime as an "alternative". These are forces which regard the masses' discontent with the present government, and not the degree of the masses' agreement with the program of the communists, as the sole criterion for explaining the trend of the revolution, and [consequently] take the dissemination of the former — what is only a necessary condition — as both necessary and sufficient conditions for a new revolutionary escalation. These forces, we believe, evade the specific analysis of the specific conditions, and relegate the role and significance of the communist revolutionary practice in transforming the masses' new political uplift into a revolutionary escalation. This subordination to the spontaneous protest movement and setting hopes on it uncritically is all that may cause the course of events to reverse precisely to what is not expected, i.e. towards consolidating and unifying the rule of monopoly capital.

Therefore, the first practical conclusion of the "two factions" discussion is this: We must make invalid in the eyes of the masses both the present government (the IRP and the liberal current) and, at the same time, the alternative of the monopoly bourgeoisie, and put forward against these two the proletarian alternative. The exposure of the present government, however explicitly and consistently it may be carried out, is not sufficient to differentiate the proletarian policy from the bourgeois policy.

The second practical conclusion of our discussion, which is generally based upon a Leninist perception of the relationship between politics and economy in the epoch of imperialism, is this: In order to revive its paradise of capital accumulation, the bourgeoisie needs to mount a violent attack on the camp of the revolution and establish a counter-revolutionary order in the society. The Islamic Republic has, in practice, shown more than ever that while playing a worthwhile part in creating the grounds for this attack, itself is unable to thoroughly organize it and lead it to a decisive conclusion (the revolutionary Kurdistan and the resistance of the militant workers have played a determining role in making this evident). Hence the bourgeoisie undoubtedly attempts to organize this final attack in new forms, with new ideological justifications and under the leadership of its other political forces. From the viewpoint of the Iranian bourgeoisie, the Islamic Republic is approaching the end of its useful life and service, and the pursuit of counterrevolutionary aims of the bourgeoisie more than ever necessitates a new form of leadership (this does not mean at all that the present regime will not attempt to prolong its life in the service of capital and imperialism). The revolutionary proletariat must array its forces against the inevitable final attack of the bourgeoisie and those probable new forms and methods that it may adopt.

Whether such an all-out attack is set on by the Islamic Republic itself by adding fuel to the patriotic feeling of the masses and under the pretext of conditions of economic boycott, war situation, etc., or is mounted by other political forces of the bourgeoisie which may substitute the present regime in various forms (coup d'ιtat, direct occupation by foreign armies, expansion of the activities of the monarchist groups and parties, etc.), it must be suppressed by the tamp of the revolution and under the leadership of the proletariat. The communists, as the conscious representatives of the proletariat, must explicitly declare that: "The age of the Islamic Republic is over. It is approaching the end of its life as the consciousness of the masses elevates. What must be substituted for it is net the fresh and newfangled representatives of the bourgeoisie, but it is the power of the proletariat and its allies. Hence, any emergency rescue attempts for the bourgeoisie, any unexpected intervention by the bourgeoisie and imperialism to inspire the counter-revolution with a new spirit, any attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie and imperialism to perplex the issues of the class straggle, and any attempt to substitute the moribund counter-revolution with fresh forces, should ail be decisively suppressed. The two-year struggle of the revolutionary proletariat has removed the cover of hypocrisy from the face of the Islamic Republic, exposed its anti-worker and anti-democratic nature to the masses, offset its futile efforts to suppress the revolution and step by step driven it to the brink of ruin. The proletariat will persistently stand against any politico-military jugglery intending to strengthen and consolidate this government or replace it with an organized and coherent force." This is that aspect of the "two factions" discussion upon which we based our platforms on the coup and the war.

There remains, however, an important practical upshot — which is related to the above points but at a more specific level —to be inferred from this discussion: the necessity to present a communist program at the level of society and carry on an extensive work of agitation and organisation on the basis of this program. If we are to free and protect the masses from oscillation between various factions Of the bourgeoisie, if we are to expose the liberal critique of the IRP's "monopolistic desires" as well as the bourgeois critique of the whole of the Islamic Republic, and substitute for these a proletarian critique of the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution as a whole in the consciousness of the masses, and, finally, if we are to transform the masses' new political uplift into a revolutionary escalation, then we must depict the communists as a real political alternative in the minds of the masses of workers and toilers. This crucial and determining task is not possible except by, Presenting, propagandizing and agitating for a clear-cut communist program:

Firstly, it is time to settle accounts with populism once and for all. It must explicitly be declared to the working class and the non-proletarian toiling masses that the communists fight for socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat. It must explicitly be declared that the aim of the communist movement is the establishment of the dictatorship of one class, and one class only, and that the democratic revolution and the revolutionary republic are for this class, the proletariat, only bases of operation and spring-boards for leaping towards socialism. Propagandizing socialism unambiguously, advocating communism as revolutionary ideology and movement, and on this basis, carrying on ever more extensively the work of communist organization of the proletariat, are the preconditions for the continuation of the present revolution. This is the maximum part of the communist's program which to date has been pale and missing amidst the populist propaganda.

Today, we must categorically differentiate ourselves from petty-bourgeois socialism. We must call upon the workers not only to revolution but also to communism and the communist movement. This is the first step for leading the present revolution by the communist proletariat. Today, we must isolate and expel from the ranks of the proletariat those who refrain from propagandizing socialism under the pretext that "this is a democratic revolution", those who due to "tactical considerations" put on the cover of "non alignment" in the factories, towns and country-sides, those who advance among the workers opportunism, reformism and moderateness towards the "democratic allies" instead of propagating the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and finally those who deprive the proletariat of a clear picture of the ultimate aim of the class struggle. We should not forget that the necessary condition for the victory of a democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat is the existence of a large section of workers who are aware of their long-term interests, who do not look at the victory of the democratic revolution as an end-in-itself and who regard it as a necessary step for the establishment of the preconditions of the final move of the working class towards socialism." (The Myth of the National and Progressive Bourgeoisie(1), English Edition, T. S. No. 5, pp. 10).

To the same extent that the communists have today before them the task of attracting the support of petty-bourgeois revolutionary democracy, they must themselves determine and declare the conditions of their support of the petty-bourgeois democratic forces (this currently rare phenomenon). The true criteria of democratism must be explicitly reminded to the forces such as Mojahedin-e-Khalg: "The defence of all political prisoners, democratic rights for all people, resistance against the encroachments made by the government upon these rights, and ... (even if you are consistent in doing these, which is not the case), are not sufficient for cal-ling you revolutionary democrats. Today, you must clear up your position in regard with the Communist movement and communism as the revolutionary ideology and movement of the proletariat and the representative of consistent democratism. The indicator of the escalation of revolution is the extent to which the proletariat exercises its leadership in the democratic movement; and if you claim to be an adhere of revolutionary democratism, then you should explicitly express your position as regards the revolutionary proletariat, its ideology and its vanguard movement, i.e. Marxism-Leninism."

Secondly, that aspect of the communists' program which is of determining importance in the present specific circumstances — the new mass political uplift on the one hand and the gradual advancement of the monopoly bourgeoisie in the ranks of the counter-revolution on the other hand — is the minimum demands. The communists' minimum program, which must formulate and set forth the content of the victory of the democratic revolution in the form of definite political and economic demands, is that clear picture of the present revolution and its objectives the communists must depict for the masses. The widespread agitation for the communists' minimum demands, as the banner of the democratic revolution, is precisely that practical step which can secure the workers and toilers, in the impending elevation of their struggles, from falling into following bourgeois-liberalism and petty-bourgeois inconsistent democratism on the one hand, and the counter-revolutionary slogans of the monopoly bourgeoisie's representatives on the other hand. Today, the liberals, by promising only one thousandth of what our minimum program guarantees for all people, try to take advantage of the uplifting waves of mass protest and, once again, bring the Iranian revolution to shambles. Today the communist movement has gained another opportunity to make up for all the consequences of its opportunism and illusions towards the liberal bourgeoisie ("national"!?) and towards the petty-bourgeois leadership of the anti-monarchist movement in the pre-Uprising period. If the communists' minimum program — which includes definite steps for the establishment and guarantee of political democracy, defence of the living conditions of the workers and toilers, and improvement of the material and intellectual welfare of the people — turns into the slogan of the masses, if the masses clearly recognize the minimum demands of the communists as their own objectives in the present revolution and insist upon them, then the transformation of the new mass political uplift into a revolutionary escalation will be certain and, for the bourgeoisie, irremediable.

Today we must clearly define, and agitate for, the minimum demands of the communists item by item. By this we mean the positive definition of the revolution to the importance of which we formerly referred —the definition of the revolution on the basis of what it is, and it must be, instead of what it is not. The minimum program, as the basis for a single policy of widespread agitation, enables the communists to go beyond the critics of the existing system in the consciousness of the toiling and oppressed masses as well as in the reality of class struggle, and turn into a real and reliable force which can achieve their democratic rights, elevate their living conditions and organize the struggle for defending these against the aggression of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. Without presenting the minimum program and its specified demands and agitating for them extensively and consistently, it would not be possible to turn the communists into an alternative for leading the new waves of mass democratic struggle.

Thirdly, the communists must determine the action and slogans of action through which they have to catty on straggle for achieving the minimum demand of the communist program, and on the basis of which they should endeavour to extensively organize the masses. [For example] the right of nations to self-determination is one of our minimum democratic demands; but the practical struggle for its achievement must today be organized around the axis of defending the revolutionary Kurdistan and Kurdish people. Unemployment insurance is one of our [minimum] demands; but that action and slogan of action through which the struggle in this area must be organized is the "workers unity against unemployment". The whole list of our workers' demands (including the demands regarding women workers) must likewise be the content of specific actions and slogans around which the workers get organized at the present time. Real councils, workers' control over production and distribution, the issue of workers' special benefit[18], dismissal and so forth, are all those issues that organizing the struggle over them and on the beefs of definite slogans of action is the practical method of putting forward our minimum demands. Putting forward the minimum demands as well as the actions and slogans based upon them, will [moreover] help Secure the workers' and revolutionary movement from the encroachment of the liberals and the inconsistent petty-bourgeois democracy. In the course of the previous stage of revolution, the content of revolution took shape in the narrow framework of "independence, freedom, Islamic Republic" (this latter, of course, with great efforts by the petty-bourgeois leadership), and due to this very illusion the bourgeoisie took the opportunity to slur over it. Our demands and actions will define the true content of revolution go clearly that not only the most skilful jockeys of the bourgeoisie's history and the most distinguished hypocrites of this class may not fare to mount the waves of revolution, but also the wavering petty- bourgeois democrats would not dare to draw off except by disgracing themselves.

These are the tasks before the communists due to the objective conditions. The extent to which the communist movement is prepared is, however, another question. In the absence of the party of the class, the proletariat will undoubtedly face a variety of slogans, programs and guide-lines put forward by numerous organizations of the communist movement. As we have formerly indicated, the specific conditions of our revolution is such that while the communist movement has not yet resolved the question of program and party, it has found itself before the task of organizing a broad proletarian movement and leading a revolutionary movement. This paradox, however, may only be solved in the world outside of mind. The key to the problem is undoubtedly this: the question of ideological struggle, party and program, and the question of organization and leadership of the proletarian and revolutionary movement must both be solved in relationship and connection with one another. Withdrawing from or underestimating any of these two aspects of practice, viewing each in abstraction from another, is to blind ourselves to the specific conditions of the workers' and communist movement of Iran in the present era. And this will lead only to failure in both fields.

We conclude this discussion at this general level and hope to follow the deductions made here in other articles at a more specific level. In this discussion we attempted to clarify our stand against the two principal deviationist positions with respect to the counter-revolution:

    1) The opportunist position, which seeks to find a "progressive" element within the government and, in one way or another, ends up with supporting this or that faction of the government.

    2) The anarchist position, which takes a stand against the whole of the present government, but nevertheless views it as an absolute and falls to consider the course of development of the counter-revolutionary camp and consequently the possibility of emergence of a bourgeois alternative to this government. This position leads in practice to 1) following the masses in their opposition and discontent with the government, and 2) the absence of any opposition to the alternative of the monopoly bourgeoisie which — just as the proletarian and revolutionary alternative - endeavours to grow and consolidate itself on the ground of dissemination of discontent with the current government.

In the face of these two deviationist positions, we laid stress upon the importance of defining clearly the content and objectives of the revolution, from the point of view of the interests of the proletariat, in the form of a clear-cut communist program (including maximum and minimum parts) and those slogans of action containing the proletarian methods of struggle for these objectives. This is, in our view, the essential condition for maintaining the independence of the proletariat and securing its leadership in the revolutionary movement with the first signs of impending escalation of which we today are facing.

M. Hekmat


[11] This refers to an ideal society based on the rules of the holy book, Qoran, in which unity, justice and equality for all Moslems are accomplished. —Ed.

[12] Ayatollah Taleqhani - a prominent Ayatollah at the time of the Uprising and the popular Ayatollah of the Mojahedin. He died a few months after the Uprising. —Ed.

[13] "Nofsed-e-Fel-Arz": means literally "corrupted on the earth"; refers to those who have committed any act against the divine rules of holy book, Qoran. —Ed.

[14] "Ommatt": Islamic Nation. —Ed.

[15] A title of the twelfth Imam of Shi'at Moslems who disappeared when he was a child, and all Moslems have been waiting for him to come back and clear the world of corruption, oppression, etc. It is implicitly claimed by the supporters of Khomeini that he is, if not the twelfth Imam himself, a divine symbol of him —Ed.

[16] God is the greatest. —Ed.

[17] This refers to a popular slogan at the time of the Uprising. —Ed.

[18] This refers to a law passed under the Shah according to which workers could have a marginal share of the annual net profit of companies. Whilst the Shah's regime for obvious reasons could put into force this law essentially to deceive the workers, the Islamic Republic Regime grappling with the deep economic crisis could not even endure this marginal increase in the workers' wages — which in best cases did not exceed one weeks wage of the workers per year — and soon after the Uprising abolished the law under the pretext that it was a monarchist law". Since then this issue has been one of the practical issues of the workers' struggle. —Ed.


1- The present text has been translated by the "Supporters of the 'Unity of Communist Militants' - U.S.A."
2- The "Supporters of the 'Unity of Communist Militants' - Britain" accepts full responsibility for the translations of the works of the Unity of Communist Militants.
3- We request our readers to send us their comments on the quality of the translations and thus help us to correct the mistakes that may have occurred.


Already published
1- The Iranian Revolution and the Role of the Proletariat (Theses)+, M. Hekmat, T. Yashar, M. Hooman, (November/December 1978).
2- The Invasion of the Iraqi Regime and Our Tasks.+ U.C.M. (September 1980).
3- Manifesto of the UCM (What it says, and what political system it is fighting for in the present situation)+* U.C.M. (February 1981).
4- Programme of the UCM+*, U.C.M. (March 1981).
5- The 1st of May and the Tasks of the Iranian Workers*+, U.C.M. (May 1981).
6- Manifesto of the UCM About the "Present Situation, its Perspectives and the Tasks of the Communists", U.C.M. (June 1981).
7- The Content of the Victory of the Democratic Revolution of Iran, M. Hooman, P. Azad, M. Hekmat, (July/August 1980).
8- The Myth of the National and Progressive Bourgeoisie (No.1), M.Hekmat, (May 1971).
9- The Myth of the National and Progressive Bourgeoisie (No.2), M.Hekmat, (April 1980).
10- Populism in the Minimum Programme: A Critique of "What the Fedaean-e-Khalgh Say", M. Hekmat, (January 1981).
11- War, Theory and the "Theory of War", M.Hekmat, (October 1980).
12- Social-Chauvinism: Rasmandegan Under the Banner of Kar 69, N. Javid, (October 1980)
13- Anarcho-Pacifism: Peykar with the Wooden Sword. F. Partow, H. Javid, (October 1980)
14- About the Manifesto "The Invasion of the Iraqi Regime and Our Tasks", M. Hekmat (October 1980)+.
15- "Programme of the Communist Party" adopted by Komala and the UCM+*, (April 1982).
16- "Resolutions and Documents of the First Congress of the UCM" (September/October) 1982).
17- Some Leaflets+*
To be Published

1- Three Sources and Three Component Parts of the Popular Socialism of Iran, M. Hekmat, (October 1980).
2- Communists and the Peasant Movement, After the Imperialist Solution of the Agrarian Question in Iran. Introduction by M. Hekmat and M. Farhang; text by M. Hekmat, (March 1980).
3- The Question of Women is a Question of Workers.** K. Davar (February 1982).
* Also available in French. + Also available in German.
** Already published in French and German.

The above publications are also available from:
- B.P. No-23, 75660, Paris Cedex 14, France.
- Postlagerkarte Nr. 055266 B, 1000 Berlin 120, W. Germany.
- UMC Box 212, 2265 Westwood Blvd., Suite B, Los Angeles, Ca 90064, U.S.A. #0030en